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How Warren Buffett Makes Decisions – The Secret to His Investing Success.

By Michael Lewis.

Warren Buffett is considered by many to be the most successful stock investor ever. Despite the occasional mistake, Buffett’s investing strategies are unrivaled. In 1956, at age 26, his net worth was estimated at $140,000. MarketWatch estimated his net worth at the end of 2016 to be $73.1 billion, an astounding compound annual growth rate of 24.5%. By contrast, the S&P 500 has grown at an average rate of 6.79% and most mutual funds have failed to equal the annual S&P 500 return consistently.

Buffett has achieved these returns while most of his competition failed. According to John Bogle, one of the founders and former Chairman of The Vanguard Group, “The evidence is compelling that equity fund returns lag the stock market by a substantial amount, largely accounted for by cost, and that fund investor returns lag fund returns by a substantial amount, largely accounted for by counterproductive market timing and fund selection.”

Since the evidence shows that Buffet has been an exceptional investor, market observers and psychologists have searched for an explanation to his success. Why has Warren Buffett achieved extraordinary gains compared to his peers? What is his secret?

A Long-Term Perspective. Why Some People Are More Successful Than Others.
Philosophers and scientists have long sought to determine why some people are more successful than others at building wealth. Their findings are varied and often contradictory.

For centuries, people believed their fate, including wealth and status, depended upon the capricious favor of pagan gods – more specifically, the favor of Tyche (Greek) or Fortuna (Roman). Expansion of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions and their concepts of “free will” led to the general belief that individuals could control their destiny through their actions, or lack thereof.

Modern science, specifically psychology and neuroscience, advanced a theory of biological determinants that control human decisions and actions. This theory suggests that free will might not be as “free” as previously thought. In other words, we may be predisposed to certain behaviors that affect the ways we process information and make decisions.

Evolutionary biologists and psychologists have developed a variety of different theories to explain human decision-making. Some claim that the ability to make superior decisions with favorable outcomes is the result of eons of natural selection, which favors individuals with exceptional genetics, such as those with high IQs.

Despite the perception that a high IQ is necessary for building wealth, study after study indicates that the link between super-intelligence and financial success is dubious at best:

Dr. Jay Zagorsky’s study in the Intelligence Journal found no strong relationship between total wealth and intelligence: “People don’t become rich just because they are smart.”
Mensa members rank in the top 2% of the brightest people on earth, but most are not rich and are “certainly not the top 1% financially,” according to an organization spokesperson. A study by Eleanor Laise of the Mensa Investment Club noted that the fund averaged 2.5% per annum for a 15-year period, while the S&P 500 averaged 15.3% during the same time. One member admitted that “we can screw up faster than anyone,” while another described their investment strategy as “buy low, sell lower.”
Buffett has never claimed to be a genius. When asked what he would teach the next generation of investors at the 2009 Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, he replied, “In the investing business, if you have an IQ of 150, sell 30 points to someone else. You do not need to be a genius . . . It’s not a complicated game; you don’t need to understand math. It’s simple, but not easy.”

He later expanded the thought: “If calculus or algebra were required to be a great investor, I’d have to go back to delivering newspapers.”

Economists’ Rational Man.
Economists have historically based their models upon the presumption that humans make logical decisions. In other words, a person faced with a choice balances certainties against risks. The theory of expected value presumes that people facing choices will choose the one that has the largest combination of expected success (probability) and value (impact).

A rational person would always model the industrious ant in Aesop’s fable, not the insouciant grasshopper. The idea that people would make decisions contrary to their interests is inconceivable to economists.

To be fair, most economists recognize the flaws in their models. Swedish economist Lars Syll notes that “a theoretical model is nothing more than an argument that a set of conclusions follows from a fixed set of assumptions.”

Economists presume stable systems and simple assumptions, while the real world is in constant flux. Paraphrasing H.L Mencken’s famous quote, there is always a simple economic model [well-known solution] for every human problem. This notion is neat, plausible, and wrong.

Psychologists’ Natural Man.
According to Harvard professor Daniel Lieberman, humans are naturally inclined to seek the solutions that require the least expenditure of energy.

In the real world, we have difficulty deferring immediate gratification for future security, selecting investments best suited to our long-term goals and risk profile, and acting in our best financial interests. Psychological research suggests that the difficulty is rooted in our brains – how we think and make decisions.

Researchers Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor postulate that humans are “cognitive misers,” preferring to do as little thinking as possible. The brain uses more energy than any other human organ, accounting for up to 20% of the body’s total intake.

When decisions involve issues more remote from our current state in distance or time, there is a tendency to defer making a choice. This impulse accounts for the failure of people to save in the present since the payoff is years in the future.

As far as we know, Mr. Buffett’ brain is similar to other investors and he experiences the same impulses and anxieties as others. While he experiences the tensions that arise in everyone when making decisions, he has learned to control impulses and make reasoned, rational decisions.

Our Two-Brain System.
The studies by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky provide new insight into decision-making, perhaps the key to Buffett’s success. They theorize that each human uses two systems of mental processing (System 1 and System 2) that work together seamlessly most of the time. Khaneman’s book, “Thinking, Fast and Slow,” outlines these two systems.

System 1 – Think Fast.
System 1, also referred to as the “emotional brain,” developed as the limbic system in the brain of early humans. Sometimes called the “mammalian brain,” it includes the amygdala, the organ where emotions and memories arise.

Neuroscientist Paul MacLean hypothesized that the limbic system was one of the first steps in the evolution of the human brain, developed as part of its fight or flight circuitry. Through necessity, our primitive ancestors had to react quickly to danger when seconds could mean escape or death.

The emotional brain is always active, capable of making quick decisions with scant information and conscious effort. It continuously makes and remakes models – heuristic frames – of the world around it, relying on the senses and memories of past events.

For example, an experienced driver coordinates steering and speed of an automobile on an empty highway almost effortlessly, even casually. The driver can simultaneously carry on conversations with passengers or listen to the radio without losing control of the vehicle. The driver is relying on the decisions of System 1.

The emotional brain is also the source of intuition, that “inner voice” or gut feeling we sometimes get without being consciously aware of the underlying reasons for its occurrence. We rely primarily on this system for the hundreds of everyday decisions we make – what to wear, where to sit, identifying a friend. Paradoxically, System 1 is a source of creativity as well as habits.

System 2 – Think Slow.
System 2, also called the “logical brain,” is slower, more deliberate, and analytical, rationally balancing the benefits and costs of each choice using all the available information.

System 2 decisions take place in the latest evolutionary addition to the brain – the neocortex. It is believed to be the center of humans’ extraordinary cognitive activity. System 2 was slower to evolve in humans and requires more energy to exercise, indicating the old saw “Thinking is hard” is a fact.

Kahneman characterizes System 2 as “the conscious, reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and do.” It is in charge of decisions about the future, while System 1 is more active in the moment. While our emotional brain can generate complex patterns of ideas, it is also freewheeling, impulsive, and often inappropriate.

Fortunately, System 1 works well most of the time; its models of everyday situations are accurate, its short-term predictions are usually correct, and its initial reactions to challenges are swift and mostly appropriate.

System 2 is more controlled, rule-based, and analytical, continuously monitoring the quality of the answers provided by System 1. Our logical brain becomes active when it needs to override an automatic judgment of System 1.

For example, the earlier driver proceeding casually down the road is more focused when passing a semi-truck on a narrow two-lane road or in heavy traffic, actively processing the changing conditions and responding with deliberate actions. His or her mental effort is accompanied by detectable physical changes, such as tensed muscles, increased heart rate, and dilated pupils. In these circumstances, System 2 is in charge.

The logical brain normally functions in low-effort mode, always in reserve until System 1 encounters a problem it cannot solve or is required to act in a way that doesn’t come naturally. Solving for the product of 37 x 82 requires the deliberate processes of System 2, while the answer to a simple addition problem, such as the sum of 2 + 2, is a System 1 function. The answer is not calculated, but summoned from memory.

Neuropsychologists Abigail Baird and Jonathan Fugelsang’s 2004 study indicates that System 2 does not fully develop until adulthood. Their findings suggest the reason that adolescents are more likely to engage in risky behavior is because they lack the mental hardware to weigh decisions rationally. For most people, the two systems work together seamlessly, transitioning from one to the other as needed.

The Buffett Style.
The Oracle of Omaha’s key to investing is understanding and coordinating the two systems of decision-making. Buffett relies upon System 1 to intuitively seek out investments he finds attractive and understands.

When deciding on a possible investment, he recommends, “If you need a computer or a calculator to decide whether to invest, then don’t do it – invest in something that shouts at you – if it is not obvious, walk away . . . If you don’t know the business, the financials won’t help at all.”

Avoid the Traps of Thinking Fast.
Master investors like Buffett simplify their decisions by relying upon System 1, and it serves them well in most cases. However, they recognize that their emotional decision-making system is also prone to biases and errors, including:

Mental Framing.
Our brains, equipped with millions of sensory inputs, create interpretive mental “frames” or filters to make sense of data. These mental filters help us understand and respond to the events around us. Framing is a heuristic – a mental shortcut – that provides a quick, easy way to process information. Unfortunately, framing can also provide a limited, simplistic view of reality that can lead to flawed decisions.

The choices we make depend on our perspective, or the frames surrounding the problem. For example, research shows that people are likely to proceed with a decision if the outcome is presented with a 50% chance of success and decline if the consequence is expressed with a 50% chance of failure, even though the probability is the same in either case.

Most investors incorrectly frame stock investments by thinking of the stock market as a stream of electronic bits of data independent of the underlying businesses the data represents. The constant flow of information about prices, economies, and expert opinions triggers our emotional brains and stimulates quick decisions to reap profits (pleasure) or prevent loss (pain).

Buffett recommends investors not think of an investment in stock as “a piece of paper whose price wiggles around daily” and is a candidate for sale whenever you get nervous.

Short-term thinking – System 1 – often leads to trading stocks, not investing in companies. Day traders – those who buy and sell stocks within a single market session – are unusually unsuccessful, according to day trading studies by the University of California-Berkeley:

80% of all day traders quit within the first two years.
Active traders underperform the stock market average by 6.5% annually.
Only 1.6% of day traders make a net profit each year.
Financial data is especially susceptible to framing. Companies always express earnings and losses positively, either as an increase compared to past results or a smaller loss than previous periods. Trends can be manipulated based upon the comparison point and time interval.

Even the words we use to describe a choice establish a frame for assessing value. Characterizations like “high growth,” “turnaround,” or “cyclical” trigger the subconscious stereotypes we have for such terms without regard to the underlying financial data.

Framing can lead rational people to make irrational decisions based upon their projections of the outcome. This accounts for the difference between economics’ rational man and psychology’s natural man.

Buffett has learned to frame his investment opportunities appropriately to avoid short-term, arbitrary outcomes:

“We [Berkshire Hathaway] select such investments on a long-term basis, weighing the same factors as would be involved in the purchase of 100% of an operating business.”
“When we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever.”
“If you aren’t willing to own a stock for 10 years, don’t even think about owning it 10 minutes.”
Loss Aversion.
Kahneman and Tversky determined that in human decision-making, losses loom larger than gains. Their experiments suggest that the pain of loss is twice as a great as the pleasure from gain. This feeling arises in the amygdala, which is responsible for generating fearful emotions and memories of painful associations.

The fact that investors are more likely to sell stocks with profit than those with a loss, when the converse strategy would be more logical, is evidence of the power of loss aversion.

While Buffett sells his positions infrequently, he cuts his losses when he realizes he has made a judgment error. In 2016, Buffett substantially reduced or liquidated his position in three companies, because he believed they had lost their competitive edge:

Wal-Mart: Despite his regrets that he had not purchased more shares earlier, he has been a long-time investor in the company. The rationale for the recent sales is thought to be due to the transition of the retail market from bricks-and-mortar stores to online. A Pew Research Center study found almost 80% of Americans today are online shoppers versus 22% in 2000.
Deere & Co: Buffett’s initial purchases of the agricultural equipment manufacturer began in the third quarter of 2012. By 2016, he owned almost 22-million shares with an average cost of less than $80 per share. He liquidated his shares during the last two quarters of 2016 when prices were more than $100 per share. Buffett may have felt that farm income, having fallen by half since 2013 due to worldwide bumper crops, was unlikely to improve, leaving the premier provider of agricultural equipment unable to continue to expand its profits.
Verizon: Having owned the stock since 2014, he liquidated his entire position in 2016, due to a loss of confidence in management after the company’s questionable acquisition of Yahoo and the continued turmoil in the wireless carrier market.
Our distaste for losses can create anxiety and trick us into acting prematurely because we fear being left out in a rising market or staying too long in a bear market. Buffett and Munger practice “assiduity – the ability to sit on your ass and do nothing until a great opportunity presents itself.”

Representativeness.
People tend to ignore statistics and focus on stereotypes. An example in the Association of Psychological Science Journal illustrates this common bias. When asked to select the proper occupation of a shy, withdrawn man who takes little interest in the real world from a list including farmer, salesman, pilot, doctor, and librarian, most people incorrectly chose librarian. Their decision ignores the obvious: there are many more farmers in the world than librarians.

Buffett focuses on finding the “inevitables” – great companies with insurmountable advantages – rather than following conventional wisdom and accepted patterns of thinking favored by System 1’s decision-making process. In his 1996 letter to investors, he defines Coca-Cola and Gillette as two companies that “will dominate their fields worldwide for an investment lifetime.”

He is especially wary of “imposters” – those companies that seem invincible but lack real competitive advantage. For every inevitable, there are dozens of imposters. According to Buffett, General Motors, IBM, and Sears lost their seemingly insurmountable advantages when values declined in “the presence of hubris or of boredom that caused the attention of the managers to wander.”

Buffett recognizes that companies in high-tech or embryonic industries capture our imaginations – and excite our emotional brains – with their promise of extraordinary gains. However, he prefers investments where he is “certain of a good result [rather] than hopeful of a great one” – an example of the logical brain at work.

Anchoring.
Evolution is the reason humans rely too heavily on the first or a single bit of information they receive – their “first impression.” In a world of deadly perils, delaying action can lead to pain or death. Therefore, first impressions linger in our minds and affect subsequent decisions. We subconsciously believe that what happened in the past will happen in the future, leading us to exaggerate the importance of the initial purchase price in subsequent decisions to sell a security.

Investors unknowingly make decisions based on anchoring data, such as previous stock prices, past years’ earnings, consensus analyst projections or expert opinions, and prevailing attitudes about the direction of stock prices, whether in a bear or bull market. While some characterize this effect as following a trend, it is a System 1 shortcut based on partial information, rather than the result of System 2 analysis.

Buffett often goes against the trend of popular opinion, recognizing that “most people get interested in stocks when everyone else is. The time to get interested is when no one else is. You can’t buy what is popular and do well.” When making a decision based on historical data, he notes, “If past history was all that is needed to play the game of money, the richest people would be librarians.”

Buffett’s approach is neither to follow the herd nor purposely do the opposite of the consensus. Whether people concur with his analysis isn’t important. His goal is simple: acquire, at a reasonable price, a business with excellent economics and able, honest management.

Despite considering IBM an “imposter” in 1996, Berkshire Hathaway began acquiring the stock in 2011, consistently adding to Buffett’s position over the years. By the end of the first quarter in 2017, Berkshire owned more than 8% of the outstanding shares with a value greater than $14 billion.

While his analysis remains confidential, Buffett believes that the investors have discounted the future of IBM too severely and failed to note its transition to a cloud-based business might lead to brighter growth prospects and a high degree of customer retention. Also, the company pays a dividend almost twice the level of the S&P 500 and actively repurchases shares on the open market.

The growing IBM position – quadrupling since the initial purchase – is evidence that Buffett isn’t afraid to take action when he is comfortable with his analysis: “Opportunities come infrequently. When it rains gold, put out the bucket, not the thimble.”

Availability.
Humans tend to estimate the likelihood of an event occurring based on the ease with which it comes to mind. For example, a 2008 study of State lottery sales showed that stores that sell a publicized, winning lottery ticket experience a 12% to 38% increase in sales for up to 40 weeks following the announcement of the winner.

People visit stores selling a winning ticket more often due to the easy recall of the win, and a bias that the location is “lucky” and more likely to produce another winning ticket than a more convenient store down the street.

This bias frequently affects decisions about stock investments. In other words, investor perceptions lag reality. Momentum, whether upward or downward, continues well past the emergence of new facts. Investors with losses are slow to reinvest, often sitting on the sidelines until prices have recovered most of their decline (irrational pessimism).

Conversely, reinforcement from a bull market encourages continued purchasing even after the economic cycle turns down (irrational optimism). Therefore, investors tend to buy when prices are high and sell when they are low.

The S&P 500 fell 57% between late 2007 and March 2009, devastating investor portfolios and liquidating stocks and mutual funds. Even though the index had recovered its losses by mid-2012, individual investors had not returned to equity investments, either staying in cash or purchasing less risky bonds.

At the time, Liz Ann Sonders, Chief Investment Strategist at Charles Schwab & Co., noted, “Even three-and-a-half years into this bull market and the gains we’ve seen since June [2012], it has not turned this psychology [of fear] around.” In other words, many individuals took the loss but did not participate in the subsequent recovery.

Buffett has always tried to follow the advice of his mentor, Benjamin Graham, who said, “Buy not on optimism [or sell due to pessimism], but on arithmetic.” Graham advocated objective analysis, not emotions, when buying or selling stocks: “In the short run, the market is a voting machine [emotional], but in the long run it is a weighing machine [logical].”

Affect.
We tend to assess probabilities based on our feelings about the options. In other words, we judge an option less risky solely because we favor it and vice versa. This bias can lead people to buy stock in their employer when other investments would be more appropriate for their goals. Overconfidence in one’s ability magnifies the negative impact of affect.

For example, Buffett invested $350 million in preferred stock of U.S. Airways in 1989, despite his belief that airlines and airline manufacturers had historically been a death trap for investors. The investment followed a dinner with Ed Colodny, the CEO of the airline, who impressed Buffett. Certain that the preferred stock was safe and the airline had a competitive seat cost (around 12 cents per mile), he made the investment.

Buffett later admitted his analysis “was superficial and wrong,” perhaps due to hubris and his like for Colodny. An upstart Texas airline (Southwest Airlines) subsequently upset the competitive balance in the industry with seat costs of 8 cents per mile, causing Berkshire Hathaway to write down its investment by 75%.

Buffett was lucky to make a significant profit on the investment ($216 million), primarily because the airline subsequently and unexpectedly returned to profitability and was able to pay the accrued dividends and redeem its preferred stock.

Final Word.
Mr. Buffett’s investment style has been criticized by many over the decades. Trend followers and traders are especially critical of his record and philosophy, claiming that his results are the result of “luck, given the relatively few trades that made him so wealthy.”

Hedge fund manager Michael Steinhardt, who Forbes called “Wall Street’s Greatest Trader,” said during a CNBC interview that Buffett is “the greatest PR person of all time. And he has managed to achieve a snow job that has conned virtually everyone in the press to my knowledge.”

Before following the advice of those who are quick to condemn Buffett’s investment style, it should be noted that no investment manager has come close to rivaling Buffet’s record over the past 60 years. While Steinhardt’s returns are similar to those of Buffett, his were for a period of 28 years – less than one-half of Buffett’s cycle.

Despite their antipathy, both men would agree that System 2 decision-making is critical to investment success. Steinhardt, in his autobiography “No Bull: My Life In and Out of Markets,” said that his results required “knowing more and perceiving the situation better than others did . . . Reaching a level of understanding that allows one to feel competitively informed well ahead of changes in ‘street’ views, even anticipating minor stock price changes, may justify at times making unpopular investments.”

Buffett appears to agree, insisting on taking the time for introspection and thought. “I insist on a lot of time being spent, almost every day, to just sit and think. That is very uncommon in American business. I read and think. So I do more reading and thinking, and make fewer impulsive decisions than most people in business.”

Do you take the time to gather facts and make carefully analyzed investment decisions? Perhaps you are more comfortable going with the flow. What is your decision-making preference and how has it worked out for you thus far?
Do you know anyone who has owned the same stock for 20 years? Warren Buffett has held three stocks – Coca-Cola, Wells Fargo, and American Express – for more than 20 years. He has owned one stock – Moody’s – for 15 years, and three other stocks – Proctor & Gamble, Wal-Mart, and U.S. Bancorp – for over a decade.

To be sure, Mr. Buffett’s 50-year track record is not perfect, as he has pointed out from time to time:

Berkshire Hathaway: Pique at CEO Seabird Stanton motivated his takeover of the failing textile company. Buffett later admitted the purchase was “the dumbest stock I ever bought.”
Energy Future Holding: Buffett lost a billion dollars in bonds of the bankrupt Texas electric utility. He admitted he made a huge mistake not consulting his long-term business partner Charlie Munger before closing the purchase: “I would be unwilling to share the credit for my decision to invest with anyone else. That was just a mistake – a significant mistake.”
Wal-Mart: At the 2003 Berkshire Hathaway shareholder meeting, Buffet admitted his attempt to time the market had backfired: “We bought a little, and it moved up a little, and I thought maybe it would come back. That thumb-sucking has cost us in the current area of $10 billion.”
Even with these mistakes, Buffett has focused on making big bets that he intends to hold for decades to come. A longer time horizon has allowed him to take advantage of opportunities few others have the patience for. But how has he been able to make these successful bets in the first place?

source : https://www.moneycrashers.com/warren-buffett-decisions-secret-investing-success.
August 14, 2020

Warren Buffett reveals his investment strategy and mastering the market (PART 4).

ANDY SEWER: You talked a lot about the tax cuts and the benefits to Berkshire. You didn't really get into the costs of the tax cut, which surprised me a little bit. Are there costs? I mean, is it just free money?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it makes a difference. The tax cut we get, for example, our utilities, as I mentioned in the report, that goes to the customers. That's just the nature of utility regulation. But net, we were a significant beneficiary from the tax cut.

Basically, let's just say we had one class of stock. We got two. You and I own a business together, and we think we own all the stock. But the truth is, before the tax cut, the government had a 35% share of the stock on income.

Now they didn't have a share of the assets, but they had a share of the income. And if it wanted to change it to 40, it could've changed it. But fortunately, it changed it to 21. And if we had a private business, if we had a McDonald's franchise together or an auto dealership together-- the third shareholder-- that invisible shareholder, the government-- just handed us back a bunch of the shares of stock. And our shareholders benefited, and a lot of other shareholder benefited.

ANDY SEWER: You talked about Ajit Jain and Greg Abel saying that Berkshire blood flows through their veins. Have they made a difference since they become vice chairs? And then are they like Warren and Charlie?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, they don't have the interaction. They each run a separate business. Ajit does not think about the other businesses. He thinks about the insurance business. And Greg does not think about the insurance business at all. And I think about the money and the capital and so on.

They're running two very big businesses. I mean, Ajit's business has, all told, a couple of hundred billion of assets. And Greg's business has $150 billion of revenues. They both would fit up there toward the top 10 or so in the country in terms of value, maybe the top 15. But they're very big businesses.

ANDY SEWER: But they're not exactly like you two guys?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, Charlie and I have a partnership thinking about the whole place, and we've done it forever now, and we still do.

ANDY SEWER: And Todd and Ted? I didn't see them mentioned.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they have $13 billion each, including pension funds, our pension funds, that they run. So the $173 billion we had at year end in equities-- well, we had 173, but we had another $8 billion in pension funds. So of the 180 or so, they had 26 between them that they're managing.

They got total discretion on that. They don't ask me. At the month end, I look and see what they did. They don't do much. They don't do a lot of trading or anything. But I look to see what changes they made.

Todd, for example, he made a couple of small investments in private-placement-type operations. And I know what the businesses do, but I can't tell you their names.

ANDY SEWER: Was one of those-- you made this investment in Oracle, and you sold it. Was that something they did?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, that was not something they did. That was something I did.

ANDY SEWER: Yeah, and you said, you didn't understand it. That's why you sold. But than why'd you get it in the first place?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that's a good question to which I do not have a good answer. I know enough about the cloud to know I don't know enough about the cloud.

ANDY SEWER: Right. OK. So Barclays put out a note. They said they were lowering the estimates for Berkshire for EPS. Do you read that stuff?

WARREN BUFFETT: No. Well, I mean, I may read it accidentally, but I don't seek it out to read. I'll put it that way. It just doesn't make any difference. If I spent time reading that, I wouldn't have the time to read 10Ks. And we're not going to do anything different.

I don't know what we're going to earn. As I put in the annual report-- and I really think this is unique-- we do not prepare financial statements monthly for Berkshire. There's just no other company that would do it. But there's no sense doing it.

I know where the money is. I know how the companies are doing, generally, but what difference does it make? Because I'm not going to try and hit any number for the quarter by having a sale on insurance or doing something even worse. And Charlie, he knows where we stand. And we know what businesses are doing well and which aren't. We certainly know where the money is.

ANDY SEWER: Another one-- UBS survey of Berkshire investors says, the five most important things to them are succession, investment performance, M&A opportunities, share repurchase, insurance margins. Do you read that? Does that surprise you?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, but I don't disagree with that. Somebody understands this.

ANDY SEWER: Your own investors.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that's important. To go back to when I started my partnership in 1956 that Berkshire came out of, there were seven people sitting there at a table having dinner, relatives primarily. And I said, here's the partnership agreement.

It's done under Nebraska law. It's four or five pages. You don't need to read it. But I said, here's a little half page, what I call the ground rules. And I want you to read these, and if you feel OK about that-- about the interaction, what the expectations are, and all of that sort of thing-- then we'll join forces.

And if you don't, it's fine. We shouldn't be partners. If I'm going to have a partnership with somebody, I want to be compatible. And when you have a public company, you can't control who comes in. I can't control some guy comes in and thinks we were going to pay big dividends or split the stock or something like that.

So by my actions and my communications and everything, I want to attract the people from the public market that I want, and I want to keep the others away. Costco was built-- Sal Price, who started the Price Club, I think, he sat down and figured out the customer he didn't want. And he set up a system that would keep away the customer he didn't want.

Who did he not want? He didn't want somebody buying a quart of milk with somebody behind him with a basket of $200 worth of goods waiting for that. So he put in a membership fee. And by putting in a membership fee, he killed all the drop-in business, the business that belonged to the 7-Eleven.

We want Berkshire to keep out people who have expectations about us that are different than ours. Good for them, and I hope they find somebody they fit. But if you're going to run a church, you want your seats to be filled by people that generally want to listen to your form of religion.

And you don't want it to change every week and say, gee, I need a new group. And I'll go out and talk to a bunch of investors and get them to come to my church next Sunday. Because there's only so many seats in the church. There's a 1,645,000 or so A-equivalent shares. And those are the seats, and I want them occupied by people that are on the same page I am.

ANDY SEWER: The Church of Berkshire. Seems like you've got a big weighting in financials. And of course, you finally invested in Jamie Dimon's company. Why banks right now?

WARREN BUFFETT: They're businesses I understand, and I like the price at which they're selling relative to their future prospects. I think, 10 years from now, that they'll be worth more money. And I feel there's a very high probability I'm right. And I don't think they will turn out to be the best investments at all of the whole panoply of things you could do. But I'm pretty sure that they won't disappoint me.

ANDY SEWER: Is climate change changing your insurance businesses?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, it doesn't change the insurance business.

ANDY SEWER: Does it change modeling or something in the business?

WARREN BUFFETT: It would change our insurance business if we were writing 20-year policies. If there was something that changed life mortality adversely to the interests of a life insurance company, you're stuck with a policy for 20 years if you write the life insurance policy. You'll keep paying your premiums if it's adverse to me. That's what's happened in long-term care insurance, for example.

But when you write a policy for one year at a time, see what the developments are. Cars, for example, are much safer to drive than they used to be. There used to be 15 deaths per 100 million miles driven. Now, there's a little over one. On the other hand, they've become much more expensive to fix. That little side view mirror, which used to cost 10 bucks, is now 1,000 bucks or something like that.

So you have things that are changing in terms of, if you're writing collision insurance, you've got to allow for the fact that the windshield, the bumper, all kinds of things, the side view mirror and all that are way more expensive. But if you're writing liability, people aren't going to die as often.

Climate has been changing. But the truth is that you now can buy really big catastrophe limits cheaper than you could buy them in 2005 or thereabouts, allowing for changes in the dollar and concentration of population. So far, rates have come down. That's the reason we've gotten out of the cab business to a great degree.

We were a very big writer of cab business 10 or 12 years ago. We aren't out of the cab business because of climate change. We're because the prices aren't right. And the world will change, and that's got very serious consequences. But it won't change that much from year to year. We've done very well during a period of some climate change.

ANDY SEWER: You've talked about technology advancing faster than our ability to understand it. And I'm wondering if social media, and Facebook, and Google, and Russian trolls coming in, is that maybe an example of that? Are you still worried about that problem?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think cyber poses real risks to humanity. Forgetting about the problem even of misinformation. I'm just thinking of we have railroads running over 22,000 miles of track. And some of them are carrying ammonia. And some of them are carrying chlorine and things. We have to carry them. We have no choice about that. We're required by law to carry them.

I would rather do that in a non-cyber world than a cyber world. There are all kinds of things-- the problem by something like cyber is that it's moving, and it's just unpredictable whether you'll get some crazy guy, like stuck the anthrax in the-- you know, what they can do becomes magnified. You saw what 19 guys did on 9/11.

Tools in the hands or potentially in the hands of either crazy individuals, crazy groups, or even a few crazy governments are really something. And we don't necessarily know what all the tools they have are, and that is moving all the time. Again, Einstein said, I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones. It's a dangerous world.

ANDY SEWER: I don't know if you've following this, Warren, but what do you think of Elon Musk's behavior as a CEO?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it has room for improvement. [CHUCKLING] And he would say the same thing. It's just, some people have a talent for interesting quotes, and others have a little bit more of a blocker up there that says, this could get me in a problem. But he's a remarkable guy.

I just don't see the necessity to communicate. I think I've got seven tweets, because a friend of mine signed me up for it. And she's called me about 100 times saying, can I tweet this or that? I said yes to her seven times, I guess, or something like that. I've never actually written one myself. I don't even know how to do it.


TO BE CONTINUED
July 31, 2020

Ten Ways to Create Shareholder Value (part 2).

by Alfred Rappaport.
Principle 4.
Carry only assets that maximize value.
The fourth principle takes value creation to a new level because it guides the choice of business model that value-conscious companies will adopt. There are two parts to this principle.

First, value-oriented companies regularly monitor whether there are buyers willing to pay a meaningful premium over the estimated cash flow value to the company for its business units, brands, real estate, and other detachable assets. Such an analysis is clearly a political minefield for businesses that are performing relatively well against projections or competitors but are clearly more valuable in the hands of others. Yet failure to exploit such opportunities can seriously compromise shareholder value.
A recent example is Kmart. ESL Investments, a hedge fund operated by Edward Lampert, gained control of Kmart for less than $1 billion when it was under bankruptcy protection in 2002 and when its shares were trading at less than $1. Lampert was able to recoup almost his entire investment by selling stores to Home Depot and Sears, Roebuck. In addition, he closed underperforming stores, focused on profitability by reducing capital spending and inventory levels, and eliminated Kmart’s traditional clearance sales. By the end of 2003, shares were trading at about $30; in the following year they surged to $100; and, in a deal announced in November 2004, they were used to acquire Sears. Former shareholders of Kmart are justifiably asking why the previous management was unable to similarly reinvigorate the company and why they had to liquidate their shares at distressed prices.
Second, companies can reduce the capital they employ and increase value in two ways: by focusing on high value-added activities (such as research, design, and marketing) where they enjoy a comparative advantage and by outsourcing low value-added activities (like manufacturing) when these activities can be reliably performed by others at lower cost. Examples that come to mind include Apple Computer, whose iPod is designed in Cupertino, California, and manufactured in Taiwan, and hotel companies such as Hilton Hospitality and Marriott International, which manage hotels without owning them. And then there’s Dell’s well-chronicled direct-to-customer, custom PC assembly business model, which minimizes the capital the company needs to invest in a sales force and distribution, as well as the need to carry inventories and invest in manufacturing facilities.

Principle 5.
Return cash to shareholders when there are no credible value-creating opportunities to invest in the business.
Even companies that base their strategic decision making on sound value-creation principles can slip up when it comes to decisions about cash distribution. The importance of adhering to the fifth principle has never been greater: As of the first quarter of 2006, industrial companies in the S&P 500 were sitting on more than $643 billion in cash—an amount that is likely to grow as companies continue to generate positive free cash flows at record levels.

Value-conscious companies with large amounts of excess cash and only limited value-creating investment opportunities return the money to shareholders through dividends and share buybacks. Not only does this give shareholders a chance to earn better returns elsewhere, but it also reduces the risk that management will use the excess cash to make value-destroying investments—in particular, ill-advised, overpriced acquisitions.
Just because a company engages in share buybacks, however, doesn’t mean that it abides by this principle. Many companies buy back shares purely to boost EPS, and, just as in the case of mergers and acquisitions, EPS accretion or dilution has nothing to do with whether or not a buyback makes economic sense. When an immediate boost to EPS rather than value creation dictates share buyback decisions, the selling shareholders gain at the expense of the nontendering shareholders if overvalued shares are repurchased. Especially widespread are buyback programs that offset the EPS dilution from employee stock option programs. In those kinds of situations, employee option exercises, rather than valuation, determine the number of shares the company purchases and the prices it pays.

Value-conscious companies repurchase shares only when the company’s stock is trading below management’s best estimate of value and no better return is available from investing in the business. Companies that follow this guideline serve the interests of the nontendering shareholders, who, if management’s valuation assessment is correct, gain at the expense of the tendering shareholders.

When a company’s shares are expensive and there’s no good long-term value to be had from investing in the business, paying dividends is probably the best option.

Principle 6.
Reward CEOs and other senior executives for delivering superior long-term returns.
Companies need effective pay incentives at every level to maximize the potential for superior returns. Principles 6, 7, and 8 set out appropriate guidelines for top, middle, and lower management compensation. I’ll begin with senior executives. As I’ve already observed, stock options were once widely touted as evidence of a healthy value ethos. The standard option, however, is an imperfect vehicle for motivating long-term, value-maximizing behavior. First, standard stock options reward performance well below superior-return levels. As became painfully evident in the 1990s, in a rising market, executives realize gains from any increase in share price—even one substantially below gains reaped by their competitors or the broad market. Second, the typical vesting period of three or four years, coupled with executives’ propensity to cash out early, significantly diminishes the long-term motivation that options are intended to provide. Finally, when options are hopelessly underwater, they lose their ability to motivate at all. And that happens more frequently than is generally believed. For example, about one-third of all options held by U. S. executives were below strike prices in 1999 at the height of the bull market. But the supposed remedies—increasing cash compensation, granting restricted stock or more options, or lowering the exercise price of existing options—are shareholder-unfriendly responses that rewrite the rules in midstream.

Value-conscious companies can overcome the shortcomings of standard employee stock options by adopting either a discounted indexed-option plan or a discounted equity risk option (DERO) plan. Indexed options reward executives only if the company’s shares outperform the index of the company’s peers—not simply because the market is rising. To provide management with a continuing incentive to maximize value, companies can lower exercise prices for indexed options so that executives profit from performance levels modestly below the index. Companies can address the other shortcoming of standard options—holding periods that are too short—by extending vesting periods and requiring executives to hang on to a meaningful fraction of the equity stakes they obtain from exercising their options.
For companies unable to develop a reasonable peer index, DEROs are a suitable alternative. The DERO exercise price rises annually by the yield to maturity on the ten-year U.S. Treasury note plus a fraction of the expected equity risk premium minus dividends paid to the holders of the underlying shares. Equity investors expect a minimum return consisting of the risk-free rate plus the equity risk premium. But this threshold level of performance may cause many executives to hold underwater options. By incorporating only a fraction of the estimated equity risk premium into the exercise price growth rate, a board is betting that the value added by management will more than offset the costlier options granted. Dividends are deducted from the exercise price to remove the incentive for companies to hold back dividends when they have no value-creating investment opportunities.

Principle 7.

Reward operating-unit executives for adding superior multiyear value.
While properly structured stock options are useful for corporate executives, whose mandate is to raise the performance of the company as a whole—and thus, ultimately, the stock price—such options are usually inappropriate for rewarding operating-unit executives, who have a limited impact on overall performance. A stock price that declines because of disappointing performance in other parts of the company may unfairly penalize the executives of the operating units that are doing exceptionally well. Alternatively, if an operating unit does poorly but the company’s shares rise because of superior performance by other units, the executives of that unit will enjoy an unearned windfall. In neither case do option grants motivate executives to create long-term value. Only when a company’s operating units are truly interdependent can the share price serve as a fair and useful indicator of operating performance.

Companies typically have both annual and long-term (most often three-year) incentive plans that reward operating executives for exceeding goals for financial metrics, such as revenue and operating income, and sometimes for beating nonfinancial targets as well. The trouble is that linking bonuses to the budgeting process induces managers to lowball performance possibilities. More important, the usual earnings and other accounting metrics, particularly when used as quarterly and annual measures, are not reliably linked to the long-term cash flows that produce shareholder value.
To create incentives for an operating unit, companies need to develop metrics such as shareholder value added (SVA). To calculate SVA, apply standard discounting techniques to forecasted operating cash flows that are driven by sales growth and operating margins, then subtract the investments made during the period. Because SVA is based entirely on cash flows, it does not introduce accounting distortions, which gives it a clear advantage over traditional measures. To ensure that the metric captures long-term performance, companies should extend the performance evaluation period to at least, say, a rolling three-year cycle. The program can then retain a portion of the incentive payouts to cover possible future underperformance. This approach eliminates the need for two plans by combining the annual and long-term incentive plans into one. Instead of setting budget-based thresholds for incentive compensation, companies can develop standards for superior year-to-year performance improvement, peer benchmarking, and even performance expectations implied by the share price.

to be continued part 3.
July 25, 2020

Ten Ways to Create Shareholder Value (part 1).

by Alfred Rappaport.

It’s become fashionable to blame the pursuit of shareholder value for the ills besetting corporate America: managers and investors obsessed with next quarter’s results, failure to invest in long-term growth, and even the accounting scandals that have grabbed headlines. When executives destroy the value they are supposed to be creating, they almost always claim that stock market pressure made them do it.

The reality is that the shareholder value principle has not failed management; rather, it is management that has betrayed the principle. In the 1990s, for example, many companies introduced stock options as a major component of executive compensation. The idea was to align the interests of management with those of shareholders. But the generous distribution of options largely failed to motivate value-friendly behavior because their design almost guaranteed that they would produce the opposite result. To start with, relatively short vesting periods, combined with a belief that short-term earnings fuel stock prices, encouraged executives to manage earnings, exercise their options early, and cash out opportunistically. The common practice of accelerating the vesting date for a CEO’s options at retirement added yet another incentive to focus on short-term performance.

Of course, these shortcomings were obscured during much of that decade, and corporate governance took a backseat as investors watched stock prices rise at a double-digit clip. The climate changed dramatically in the new millennium, however, as accounting scandals and a steep stock market decline triggered a rash of corporate collapses. The ensuing erosion of public trust prompted a swift regulatory response—most notably, the 2002 passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which requires companies to institute elaborate internal controls and makes corporate executives directly accountable for the accuracy of financial statements. Nonetheless, despite SOX and other measures, the focus on short-term performance persists.

In their defense, some executives contend that they have no choice but to adopt a short-term orientation, given that the average holding period for stocks in professionally managed funds has dropped from about seven years in the 1960s to less than one year today. Why consider the interests of long-term shareholders when there are none? This reasoning is deeply flawed. What matters is not investor holding periods but rather the market’s valuation horizon—the number of years of expected cash flows required to justify the stock price. While investors may focus unduly on near-term goals and hold shares for a relatively short time, stock prices reflect the market’s long view. Studies suggest that it takes more than ten years of value-creating cash flows to justify the stock prices of most companies. Management’s responsibility, therefore, is to deliver those flows—that is, to pursue long-term value maximization regardless of the mix of high- and low-turnover shareholders. And no one could reasonably argue that an absence of long-term shareholders gives management the license to maximize short-term performance and risk endangering the company’s future. The competitive landscape, not the shareholder list, should shape business strategies.

The competitive landscape, not the shareholder list, should shape business strategies.

What do companies have to do if they are to be serious about creating value? In this article, I draw on my research and several decades of consulting experience to set out ten basic governance principles for value creation that collectively will help any company with a sound, well-executed business model to better realize its potential for creating shareholder value. Though the principles will not surprise readers, applying some of them calls for practices that run deeply counter to prevailing norms. I should point out that no company—with the possible exception of Berkshire Hathaway—gets anywhere near to implementing all these principles. That’s a pity for investors because, as CEO Warren Buffett’s fellow shareholders have found, there’s a lot to be gained from owning shares in what I call a level 10 company—one that applies all ten principles. (For more on Berkshire Hathaway’s application of the ten principles, please read my colleague Michael Mauboussin’s analysis in the sidebar “Approaching Level 10: The Story of Berkshire Hathaway.”).

Principle 1.

Do not manage earnings or provide earnings guidance.
Companies that fail to embrace this first principle of shareholder value will almost certainly be unable to follow the rest. Unfortunately, that rules out most corporations because virtually all public companies play the earnings expectations game. A 2006 National Investor Relations Institute study found that 66% of 654 surveyed companies provide regular profit guidance to Wall Street analysts. A 2005 survey of 401 financial executives by Duke University’s John Graham and Campbell R. Harvey, and University of Washington’s Shivaram Rajgopal, reveals that companies manage earnings with more than just accounting gimmicks: A startling 80% of respondents said they would decrease value-creating spending on research and development, advertising, maintenance, and hiring in order to meet earnings benchmarks. More than half the executives would delay a new project even if it entailed sacrificing value.

What’s so bad about focusing on earnings? First, the accountant’s bottom line approximates neither a company’s value nor its change in value over the reporting period. Second, organizations compromise value when they invest at rates below the cost of capital (overinvestment) or forgo investment in value-creating opportunities (underinvestment) in an attempt to boost short-term earnings. Third, the practice of reporting rosy earnings via value-destroying operating decisions or by stretching permissible accounting to the limit eventually catches up with companies. Those that can no longer meet investor expectations end up destroying a substantial portion, if not all, of their market value. WorldCom, Enron, and Nortel Networks are notable examples.

Principle 2.

Make strategic decisions that maximize expected value, even at the expense of lowering near-term earnings.
Companies that manage earnings are almost bound to break this second cardinal principle. Indeed, most companies evaluate and compare strategic decisions in terms of the estimated impact on reported earnings when they should be measuring against the expected incremental value of future cash flows instead. Expected value is the weighted average value for a range of plausible scenarios. (To calculate it, multiply the value added for each scenario by the probability that that scenario will materialize, then sum up the results.) A sound strategic analysis by a company’s operating units should produce informed responses to three questions: First, how do alternative strategies affect value? Second, which strategy is most likely to create the greatest value? Third, for the selected strategy, how sensitive is the value of the most likely scenario to potential shifts in competitive dynamics and assumptions about technology life cycles, the regulatory environment, and other relevant variables?

At the corporate level, executives must also address three questions: Do any of the operating units have sufficient value-creation potential to warrant additional capital? Which units have limited potential and therefore should be candidates for restructuring or divestiture? And what mix of investments in operating units is likely to produce the most overall value?

Principle 3.

Make acquisitions that maximize expected value, even at the expense of lowering near-term earnings.
Companies typically create most of their value through day-to-day operations, but a major acquisition can create or destroy value faster than any other corporate activity. With record levels of cash and relatively low debt levels, companies increasingly use mergers and acquisitions to improve their competitive positions: M&A announcements worldwide exceeded $2.7 trillion in 2005.

Companies (even those that follow Principle 2 in other respects) and their investment bankers usually consider price/earnings multiples for comparable acquisitions and the immediate impact of earnings per share (EPS) to assess the attractiveness of a deal. They view EPS accretion as good news and its dilution as bad news. When it comes to exchange-of-shares mergers, a narrow focus on EPS poses an additional problem on top of the normal shortcomings of earnings. Whenever the acquiring company’s price/earnings multiple is greater than the selling company’s multiple, EPS rises. The inverse is also true. If the acquiring company’s multiple is lower than the selling company’s multiple, earnings per share decline. In neither case does EPS tell us anything about the deal’s long-term potential to add value.

Sound decisions about M&A deals are based on their prospects for creating value, not on their immediate EPS impact, and this is the foundation for the third principle of value creation. Management needs to identify clearly where, when, and how it can accomplish real performance gains by estimating the present value of the resulting incremental cash flows and then subtracting the acquisition premium.

Value-oriented managements and boards also carefully evaluate the risk that anticipated synergies may not materialize. They recognize the challenge of postmerger integration and the likelihood that competitors will not stand idly by while the acquiring company attempts to generate synergies at their expense. If it is financially feasible, acquiring companies confident of achieving synergies greater than the premium will pay cash so that their shareholders will not have to give up any anticipated merger gains to the selling companies’ shareholders. If management is uncertain whether the deal will generate synergies, it can hedge its bets by offering stock. This reduces potential losses for the acquiring company’s shareholders by diluting their ownership interest in the postmerger company.

to be continued part 2.
July 25, 2020

Value Investing Strategies.

By ADAM HAYES.
The key to buying an undervalued stock is to thoroughly research the company and make common-sense decisions. Value investor Christopher H. Browne recommends asking if a company is likely to increase its revenue via the following methods:

Raising prices on products.
Increasing sales figures.
Decreasing expenses.
Selling off or closing down unprofitable divisions.

Browne also suggests studying a company's competitors to evaluate its future growth prospects. But the answers to all of these questions tend to be speculative, without any real supportive numerical data. Simply put: There are no quantitative software programs yet available to help achieve these answers, which makes value stock investing somewhat of a grand guessing game. For this reason, Warren Buffett recommends investing only in industries you have personally worked in, or whose consumer goods you are familiar with, like cars, clothes, appliances, and food.

One thing investors can do is choose the stocks of companies that sell high-demand products and services. While it's difficult to predict when innovative new products will capture market share, it's easy to gauge how long a company has been in business and study how it has adapted to challenges over time.

Insider Buying and Selling.
For our purposes, insiders are the company’s senior managers and directors, plus any shareholders who own at least 10% of the company’s stock. A company’s managers and directors have unique knowledge about the companies they run, so if they are purchasing its stock, it’s reasonable to assume that the company’s prospects look favorable.

Likewise, investors who own at least 10% of a company’s stock wouldn’t have bought so much if they didn’t see profit potential. Conversely, a sale of stock by an insider doesn’t necessarily point to bad news about the company’s anticipated performance — the insider might simply need cash for any number of personal reasons. Nonetheless, if mass sell-offs are occurring by insiders, such a situation may warrant further in-depth analysis of the reason behind the sale.

Analyze Earnings Reports.
At some point, value investors have to look at a company's financials to see how its performing and compare it to industry peers.

Financial reports present a company’s annual and quarterly performance results. The annual report is SEC form 10-K, and the quarterly report is SEC form 10-Q. Companies are required to file these reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). You can find them at the SEC website or the company’s investor relations page on their website.

You can learn a lot from a company’s annual report. It will explain the products and services offered as well as where the company is heading.

Analyze Financial Statements.
A company’s balance sheet provides a big picture of the company’s financial condition. The balance sheet consists of two sections, one listing the company’s assets and another listing its liabilities and equity. The assets section is broken down into a company’s cash and cash equivalents; investments; accounts receivable or money owed from customers, inventories, and fixed assets such as plant and equipment.

The liabilities section lists the company’s accounts payable or money owed, accrued liabilities, short-term debt, and long-term debt. The shareholders’ equity section reflects how much money is invested in the company, how many shares outstanding, and how much the company has as retained earnings. Retained earnings is a type of savings account that holds the cumulative profits from the company. Retained earnings are used to pay dividends, for example, and is considered a sign of a healthy, profitable company.

The income statement tells you how much revenue is being generated, the company's expenses, and profits. Looking at the annual income statement rather than a quarterly statement will give you a better idea of the company’s overall position since many companies experience fluctuations in sales volume during the year.

 Studies have consistently found that value stocks outperform growth stocks and the market as a whole, over the long-term.
Couch Potato Value Investing
It is possible to become a value investor without ever reading a 10-K. Couch potato investing is a passive strategy of buying and holding a few investing vehicles for which someone else has already done the investment analysis—i.e., mutual funds or exchange-traded funds. In the case of value investing, those funds would be those that follow the value strategy and buy value stocks—or track the moves of high-profile value investors, like Warren Buffet. Investors can buy shares of his holding company, Berkshire Hathaway, which owns or has an interest in dozens of companies the Oracle of Omaha has researched and evaluated.

Risks with Value Investing.
As with any investment strategy, there's the risk of loss with value investing despite it being a low-to-medium-risk strategy. Below we highlight a few of those risks and why losses can occur.

The Figures are Important.
Many investors use financial statements when they make value investing decisions. So if you rely on your own analysis, make sure you have the most updated information and that your calculations are accurate. If not, you may end up making a poor investment or miss out on a great one. If you aren’t yet confident in your ability to read and analyze financial statements and reports, keep studying these subjects and don’t place any trades until you’re truly ready. (For more on this subject, learn more about financial statements.)

One strategy is to read the footnotes. These are the notes in a Form 10-K or Form 10-Q that explain a company’s financial statements in greater detail. The notes follow the statements and explain the company’s accounting methods and elaborate on reported results. If the footnotes are unintelligible or the information they present seems unreasonable, you’ll have a better idea of whether to pass on the stock.

Extraordinary Gains or Losses.
There are some incidents that may show up on a company's income statement that should be considered exceptions or extraordinary. These are generally beyond the company's control and are called extraordinary item—gain or extraordinary item—loss. Some examples include lawsuits, restructuring, or even a natural disaster. If you exclude these from your analysis, you can probably get a sense of the company's future performance.

However, think critically about these items, and use your judgment. If a company has a pattern of reporting the same extraordinary item year after year, it might not be too extraordinary. Also, if there are unexpected losses year after year, this can be a sign that the company is having financial problems. Extraordinary items are supposed to be unusual and nonrecurring. Also, beware of a pattern of write-offs.

Ignoring Ratio Analysis Flaws.
Earlier sections of this tutorial have discussed the calculation of various financial ratios that help investors diagnose a company’s financial health. There isn't just one way to determine financial ratios, which can be fairly problematic. The following can affect how the ratios can be interpreted:

Ratios can be determined using before-tax or after-tax numbers.
Some ratios don't give accurate results but lead to estimations.
Depending on how the term earnings are defined, a company's earnings per share (EPS) may differ.
Comparing different companies by their ratios—even if the ratios are the same—may be difficult since companies have different accounting practices. (Learn more about when a company recognizes profits in Understanding The Income Statement.)

Buying Overvalued Stock.
Overpaying for a stock is one of the main risks for value investors. You can risk losing part or all of your money if you overpay. The same goes if you buy a stock close to its fair market value. Buying a stock that's undervalued means your risk of losing money is reduced, even when the company doesn't do well.

Recall that one of the fundamental principles of value investing is to build a margin of safety into all your investments. This means purchasing stocks at a price of around two-thirds or less of their intrinsic value. Value investors want to risk as little capital as possible in potentially overvalued assets, so they try not to overpay for investments.

Not Diversifying.
Conventional investment wisdom says that investing in individual stocks can be a high-risk strategy. Instead, we are taught to invest in multiple stocks or stock indexes so that we have exposure to a wide variety of companies and economic sectors. However, some value investors believe that you can have a diversified portfolio even if you only own a small number of stocks, as long as you choose stocks that represent different industries and different sectors of the economy. Value investor and investment manager Christopher H. Browne recommends owning a minimum of 10 stocks in his “Little Book of Value Investing.” According to Benjamin Graham, a famous value investor, you should look at choosing 10 to 30 stocks if you want to diversify your holdings.

Another set of experts, though, say differently. If you want to get big returns, try choosing just a few stocks, according to the authors of the second edition of “Value Investing for Dummies.” They say having more stocks in your portfolio will probably lead to an average return. Of course, this advice assumes that you are great at choosing winners, which may not be the case, particularly if you are a value-investing novice.

Listening to Your Emotions.
It is difficult to ignore your emotions when making investment decisions. Even if you can take a detached, critical standpoint when evaluating numbers, fear and excitement may creep in when it comes time to actually use part of your hard-earned savings to purchase a stock. More importantly, once you have purchased the stock, you may be tempted to sell it if the price falls. Keep in mind that the point of value investing is to resist the temptation to panic and go with the herd. So don't fall into the trap of buying when share prices rise and selling when they drop. Such behavior will obliterate your returns. (Playing follow-the-leader in investing can quickly become a dangerous game.

Example of a Value Investment.
Value investors seek to profit from market overreactions that usually come from the release of a quarterly earnings report. As a historical real example, on May 4, 2016, Fitbit released its Q1 2016 earnings report and saw a sharp decline in after-hours trading. After the flurry was over, the company lost nearly 19% of its value. However, while large decreases in a company's share price are not uncommon after the release of an earnings report, Fitbit not only met analyst expectations for the quarter but even increased guidance for 2016.

The company earned $505.4 million in revenue for the first quarter of 2016, up more than 50% when compared to the same time period from one year ago. Further, Fitbit expects to generate between $565 million and $585 million in the second quarter of 2016, which is above the $531 million forecasted by analysts. The company looks to be strong and growing. However, since Fitbit invested heavily in research and development costs in the first quarter of the year, earnings per share (EPS) declined when compared to a year ago. This is all average investors needed to jump on Fitbit, selling off enough shares to cause the price to decline. However, a value investor looks at the fundamentals of Fitbit and understands it is an undervalued security, poised to potentially increase in the future.

The Bottom Line.
Value investing is a long-term strategy. Warren Buffett, for example, buys stocks with the intention of holding them almost indefinitely. He once said, “I never attempt to make money on the stock market. I buy on the assumption that they could close the market the next day and not reopen it for five years.” You will probably want to sell your stocks when it comes time to make a major purchase or retire, but by holding a variety of stocks and maintaining a long-term outlook, you can sell your stocks only when their price exceeds their fair market value (and the price you paid for them).
July 25, 2020

Value Investing.

By ADAM HAYES.

What Is Value Investing?
Value investing is an investment strategy that involves picking stocks that appear to be trading for less than their intrinsic or book value. Value investors actively ferret out stocks they think the stock market is underestimating. They believe the market overreacts to good and bad news, resulting in stock price movements that do not correspond to a company's long-term fundamentals. The overreaction offers an opportunity to profit by buying stocks at discounted prices—on sale.


Warren Buffett is probably the best-known value investor today, but there are many others, including Benjamin Graham (Buffet's professor and mentor), David Dodd, Charlie Munger, Christopher Browne (another Graham student), and billionaire hedge-fund manager, Seth Klarman.


KEY TAKEAWAYS.
Value investing is an investment strategy that involves picking stocks that appear to be trading for less than their intrinsic or book value.
Value investors actively ferret out stocks they think the stock market is underestimating.
Value investors use financial analysis, don't follow the herd, and are long-term investors of quality companies.
How Value Investing Works
The basic concept behind every-day value investing is straightforward: If you know the true value of something, you can save a lot of money when you buy it on sale. Most folks would agree that whether you buy a new TV on sale, or at full price, you’re getting the same TV with the same screen size and picture quality.


Stocks work in a similar manner, meaning the company’s stock price can change even when the company’s value or valuation has remained the same. Stocks, like TVs, go through periods of higher and lower demand leading to price fluctuations—but that doesn't change what you’re getting for your money.

Just like savvy shoppers would argue that it makes no sense to pay full price for a TV since TVs go on sale several times a year, savvy value investors believe stocks work the same way. Of course, unlike TVs, stocks won't go on sale at predictable times of the year such as Black Friday, and their sale prices won’t be advertised.

Value investing is the process of doing detective work to find these secret sales on stocks and buying them at a discount compared to how the market values them. In return for buying and holding these value stocks for the long-term, investors can be rewarded handsomely.


 Value investing developed from a concept by Columbia Business School professors Benjamin Graham and David Dodd in 1934 and was popularized in Graham's 1949 book, The Intelligent Investor.
Intrinsic Value and Value Investing
In the stock market, the equivalent of a stock being cheap or discounted is when its shares are undervalued. Value investors hope to profit from shares they perceive to be deeply discounted.


Investors use various metrics to attempt to find the valuation or intrinsic value of a stock. Intrinsic value is a combination of using financial analysis such as studying a company's financial performance, revenue, earnings, cash flow, and profit as well as fundamental factors, including the company's brand, business model, target market, and competitive advantage. Some metrics used to value a company's stock include:

Price-to-book (P/B) or book value or, which measures the value of a company's assets and compares them to the stock price. If the price is lower than the value of the assets, the stock is undervalued, assuming the company is not in financial hardship.

Price-to-earnings (P/E), which shows the company's track record for earnings to determine if the stock price is not reflecting all of the earnings or undervalued.

Free cash flow, which is the cash generated from a company's revenue or operations after the costs of expenditures have been subtracted. Free cash flow is the cash remaining after expenses have been paid, including operating expenses and large purchases called capital expenditures, which is the purchase of assets like equipment or upgrading a manufacturing plant. If a company is generating free cash flow, it'll have money left over to invest in the future of the business, pay off debt, pay dividends or rewards to shareholders, and issue share buybacks.

Of course, there are many other metrics used in the analysis, including analyzing debt, equity, sales, and revenue growth. After reviewing these metrics, the value investor can decide to purchase shares if the comparative value—the stock's current price vis-a-vis its company's intrinsic worth—is attractive enough.

Margin of Safety.
Value investors require some room for error in their estimation of value, and they often set their own "margin of safety," based on their particular risk tolerance. The margin of safety principle, one of the keys to successful value investing, is based on the premise that buying stocks at bargain prices gives you a better chance at earning a profit later when you sell them. The margin of safety also makes you less likely to lose money if the stock doesn’t perform as you had expected.

Value investors use the same sort of reasoning. If a stock is worth $100 and you buy it for $66, you’ll make a profit of $34 simply by waiting for the stock’s price to rise to the $100 true value. On top of that, the company might grow and become more valuable, giving you a chance to make even more money. If the stock’s price rises to $110, you’ll make $44 since you bought the stock on sale. If you had purchased it at its full price of $100, you would only make a $10 profit. Benjamin Graham, the father of value investing, only bought stocks when they were priced at two-thirds or less of their intrinsic value. This was the margin of safety he felt was necessary to earn the best returns while minimizing investment downside.

Markets are not Efficient.
Value investors don’t believe in the efficient-market hypothesis, which says that stock prices already take all information about a company into account, so their price always reflects their value. Instead, value investors believe that stocks may be over- or underpriced for a variety of reasons.

For example, a stock might be underpriced because the economy is performing poorly and investors are panicking and selling (as was the case during the Great Recession). Or a stock might be overpriced because investors have gotten too excited about an unproven new technology (as was the case of the dot-com bubble). Psychological biases can push a stock price up or down based on news, such as disappointing or unexpected earnings announcements, product recalls, or litigation. Stocks may also be undervalued because they trade under the radar, meaning they're inadequately covered by analysts and the media.

Don't Follow the Herd.
Value investors possess many characteristics of contrarians —they don’t follow the herd. Not only do they reject the efficient-market hypothesis, but when everyone else is buying, they’re often selling or standing back. When everyone else is selling, they’re buying or holding. Value investors don’t buy trendy stocks (because they’re typically overpriced). Instead, they invest in companies that aren’t household names if the financials check out. They also take a second look at stocks that are household names when those stocks’ prices have plummeted, believing such companies can recover from setbacks if their fundamentals remain strong and their products and services still have quality.

Value investors only care about a stock’s intrinsic value. They think about buying a stock for what it actually is: a percentage of ownership in a company. They want to own companies that they know have sound principles and sound financials, regardless of what everyone else is saying or doing.

Value Investing Requires Diligence & Patience.
Estimating the true intrinsic value of a stock involves some financial analysis but also involves a fair amount of subjectivity—meaning at times, it can be more of an art than a science. Two different investors can analyze the exact same valuation data on a company and arrive at different decisions.

Some investors, who look only at existing financials, don't put much faith in estimating future growth. Other value investors focus primarily on a company's future growth potential and estimated cash flows. And some do both: Noted value investment gurus Warren Buffett and Peter Lynch, who ran Fidelity Investment's Magellan Fund for several years are both known for analyzing financial statements and looking at valuation multiples, in order to identify cases where the market has mispriced stocks.

Despite different approaches, the underlying logic of value investing is to purchase assets for less than they are currently worth, hold them for the long-term, and profit when they return to the intrinsic value or above. It doesn't provide instant gratification. You can’t expect to buy a stock for $50 on Tuesday and sell it for $100 on Thursday. Instead, you may have to wait years before your stock investments pay off, and you will occasionally lose money. The good news is that, for most investors, long-term capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than short-term investment gains.

Like all investment strategies, you must have the patience and diligence to stick with your investment philosophy. Some stocks you might want to buy because the fundamentals are sound, but you’ll have to wait if it’s overpriced. You’ll want to buy the stock that is most attractively priced at that moment, and if no stocks meet your criteria, you'll have to sit and wait and let your cash sit idle until an opportunity arises.

One-Third.
Value investing guru Benjamin Graham argued that an undervalued stock is priced at least a third below its intrinsic value.

Why Stocks Become Undervalued.
If you don’t believe in the efficient market hypothesis, you can identify reasons why stocks might be trading below their intrinsic value. Here are a few factors that can drag a stock’s price down and make it undervalued.

Market Moves and Herd Mentality.
Sometimes people invest irrationally based on psychological biases rather than market fundamentals. When a specific stock’s price is rising or when the overall market is rising, they buy. They see that if they had invested 12 weeks ago, they could have earned 15% by now, and they develop a fear of missing out. Conversely, when a stock’s price is falling or when the overall market is declining, loss aversion compels people to sell their stocks. So instead of keeping their losses on paper and waiting for the market to change directions, they accept a certain loss by selling. Such investor behavior is so widespread that it affects the prices of individual stocks, exacerbating both upward and downward market movements creating excessive moves.

Market Crashes.
When the market reaches an unbelievable high, it usually results in a bubble. But because the levels are unsustainable, investors end up panicking, leading to a massive selloff. This results in a market crash. That's what happened in the early 2000s with the dotcom bubble, when the values of tech stocks shot up beyond what the companies were worth. We saw the same thing happened when the housing bubble burst and the market crashed in the mid-2000s.

Unnoticed and Unglamorous Stocks.
Look beyond what you're hearing in the news. You may find really great investment opportunities in undervalued stocks that may not be on people's radars like small caps or even foreign stocks. Most investors want in on the next big thing such as a technology startup instead of a boring, established consumer durables manufacturer. For example, stocks like Facebook, Apple, and Google are more likely to be affected by herd-mentality investing than conglomerates like Proctor & Gamble or Johnson & Johnson.

Bad News.
Even good companies face setbacks, such as litigation and recalls. However, just because a company experiences one negative event doesn’t mean that the company isn’t still fundamentally valuable or that its stock won’t bounce back. In other cases, there may be a segment or division that puts a dent in a company's profitability. But that can change if the company decides to dispose of or close that arm of the business.

Analysts do not have a great track record for predicting the future, and yet investors often panic and sell when a company announces earnings that are lower than analysts’ expectations. But value investors who can see beyond the downgrades and negative news can buy stock at deeper discounts because they are able to recognize a company's long-term value.

Cyclicality​.
Cyclicality is defined as the fluctuations that affect a business. Companies are not immune to ups and downs in the economic cycle, whether that's seasonality and the time of year, or consumer attitudes and moods. All of this can affect profit levels and the price of a company's stock, but it doesn't affect the company's value in the long term.

July 25, 2020


How Bitcoin Disrupts the Finance Industry .

Cryptocurrencies and their underlying blockchain technology are being touted as the next-big-thing after the creation of the internet. One area where these technologies are likely to have a major impact is the financial sector. The blockchain, as a form of distributed ledger technology (DLT), has the potential to transform well-established financial institutions and bring lower costs, faster execution of transactions, improved transparency, auditability of operations, and other benefits. Cryptocurrencies hold the promise of a new native digital asset class without a central authority.

So what do these technological developments mean for the various players in the sector and end users? “Blockchains have the potential to displace any business activity built on transactions occurring on traditional corporate databases, which is what underlies nearly every financial service function. Any financial operation that has low transparency and limited traceability is vulnerable to disruption by blockchain applications. DLT is therefore both a great opportunity and also a disruptive threat,” according to Bruce Weber, dean of Lerner College and business administration professor, and Andrew Novocin, professor of electrical and computer engineering, both at the University of Delaware.

Earlier this year, Weber, Novocin, and graduate student Jonathan Wood conducted a literature review on cryptocurrencies and DLT for the SWIFT Institute. Based on this review, the SWIFT institute recently issued a grant to conduct new research on DLT and cryptocurrencies in the financial sector. Weber and Novocin noted that just as disruptors like Amazon, Google, Facebook and Uber built software platforms and thriving businesses thanks to the connectivity provided by internet standards, next-generation startups will build new services and businesses with blockchains. “Many pundits expect blockchain, as a distributed technology, to become the foundation for new services and applications that have completely different rules from those running on hierarchical and controlled databases. Cryptocurrencies are an early example but many others will follow,” they added.

Kartik Hosanagar, a Wharton professor of marketing and operations, information and decisions, pointed out that the financial services sector is full of intermediaries such as banks that help create trust among transacting parties like lenders and borrowers. Blockchain, he said, is a mechanism to create trust without centralized control. “The power of eliminating intermediaries is the ability to lower transaction costs and take back control from powerful financial intermediaries.”

Regarding cryptocurrencies, Hosanagar pointed out that most of the value today is tied to speculative buying rather than actual use cases. But having a currency without a central authority offers “certain unique kinds of protections especially in countries with troubled central banks.” For example, Venezuela’s currency is rapidly losing value. For people who stored their savings in crypto, there was greater protection against such rapid currency devaluations. “Of course, cryptocurrencies have their own instabilities, but they aren’t tied to actions by central banks and that’s particularly relevant in countries and economies where citizens don’t trust their governments and central banks,” he said.

“Any financial operation that has low transparency and limited traceability is vulnerable to disruption by blockchain applications.”–Bruce Weber and Andrew Novocin

Hosanagar expects the first wave of applications to be rolled out in “private” blockchains where a central authority such as a financial institution and its partners are the only ones with the permission to participate (as opposed to public, permissionless blockchains where participants are anonymous and there is no central authority). Applications in the private blockchains, he said, will be more secure and will offer some of the benefits of decentralized ledgers but will not be radically different from the way things work at present. However, over time, he expects smart contracts (self-executing contracts when requirements are met) to be offered on public blockchain networks like Ethereum. “When securities are traded, intermediaries provide trust, and they charge commissions. Blockchains can help provide such trust in a low-cost manner. But trade of securities is governed by securities laws. Smart contracts offer a way to ensure compliance with the laws. They have great potential because of their ability to reduce costs while being compliant,” says Hosanagar.

According to Weber and Novocin, one area ripe for transformation is reaching consensus on important benchmark rates and prices. At present, they point out, different proprietary indexes are used to determine interest rates and the price of many mainstream assets. Blockchain can transform this. “Think of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the recent scandals involving manipulation of benchmark values when they are controlled by a single entity that may not be capable of detecting false or fraudulent data. Blockchain could provide greater transparency around the process of creating agreed upon reference prices, and allow more people to participate in the consensus process.”

Weber and Novocin expect that in some areas intermediaries will find their roles reduced as blockchain allows for automation through greater transparency and traceability. In other areas, intermediaries will find themselves well-placed to take advantage of changing needs of their clients, as firms will need help to manage the shift to new standards as well as the greater complexity of open and traceable blockchain infrastructure. Intermediaries in areas that could potentially be disrupted, they said, “should get involved with projects seeking to set the standards, so that they can stay informed and position themselves to profit from becoming the leaders in the operations of the new markets that will emerge.”

Kevin Werbach, Wharton professor of legal studies and business ethics, and author of a forthcoming book The Blockchain and the New Architecture of Trust,  said that it’s usually not helpful to focus on what aspects of a major existing market will be “transformed” or “disrupted” by new technologies. Important technologies, he said, are far more likely to be integrated into the system than replace it. According to Werbach, while some firms will fail to make the transition and some new ones will take hold, “over the long-run, virtually every historic innovation that eliminated some forms of intermediation also created new forms.”

Blockchain will reduce the massive duplication of information that creates delays, conflicts and confusion in many aspects of financial services, Werbach added. For example, when a syndicate of lenders participates in a loan, having one shared ledger means they don’t all need to keep track of it independently. International payments and corporate stock records are other examples where there are huge inefficiencies due to duplicate record-keeping and intermediaries. “End users won’t see the changes in the deep plumbing of financial services, but it will allow new service providers to emerge and new products to be offered,” said Werbach.

Bumps Along the Way

Angela Walch, professor of law at St. Mary’s University School of Law and a research fellow at the Centre for Blockchain Technologies at University College London, offered another perspective. She said there is a lot of excitement about blockchain as a distributed ledger technology for the financial sector because many believe that it offers a better, more efficient and more resilient form of recordkeeping. However, making use of the blockchain is not as simple as just buying new software and running it. “Blockchain technology is, at core, group recordkeeping. To reap its full benefits, one needs all the relevant members of the group to join the system. This requires collaboration with and across businesses, which is a potentially big hurdle, and may be the hurdle that most limits adoption.”

Governance is the biggest challenge in decentralized organizations, said Weber and Novocin. Members participating in a blockchain-supported financial function may have misaligned incentives, and can end up in gridlock, or with a chaotic outcome. They cite the example of the ‘DAO Hack,’ which was the first prominent smart contract project on the Ethereum network to suffer a large loss of funds. The Ethereum community voted to conduct a hard fork (a radical change to the protocol that makes previously invalid blocks/transactions valid or vice-versa) — reversing the transactions after the hack and essentially refunding the DAO investors. This was in effect a breach of Ethereum’s immutability and it left a sizeable minority of the community bitterly dissatisfied. This group viewed the Ethereum community as forsaking its commitment to immutable, permanent records. They refused to acknowledge the hard fork, and maintained the original Ethereum blockchain, now known as Ethereum Classic (whereas the forked version supported by the Ethereum Foundation is simply Ethereum).

“The power of eliminating intermediaries is the ability to lower transaction costs and take back control from powerful financial intermediaries.”–Kartik Hosanagar

“Distributed organizations serving an open community need to take care to design their governance systems, incentive structures and decision-making processes to create consensus without unduly slowing down the decision-making,” said Weber and Novocin. “Scenario planning or war gaming are worth exploring at the beginning of blockchain projects. Forward planning enables organizations to swiftly respond in a predictable way that is supportive of stakeholders. Publicizing these plans in advance can also build trust and user confidence.”

Cryptocurrency Risks.

Werbach listed a variety of risks and vulnerabilities related to cryptocurrencies: Bitcoin has shown that the fundamental security of its proof-of-work system is sound, but it has major limitations such as limited scalability, massive energy usage and concentration of mining pools. There has been massive theft of cryptocurrencies from the centralized intermediaries that most people use to hold it, and massive fraud by promoters of initial coin offerings and other schemes. Manipulation is widespread on lightly-regulated cryptocurrency exchanges.

For example, roughly half of Bitcoin transactions are with Tether, a “stablecoin” that claims to be backed by U.S. dollars but has never been audited and is involved in highly suspicious behavior. Money laundering and other criminal activity is a serious problem if transactions do not require some check of real-world identities. “There are major efforts to address all of these risks and vulnerabilities. Some are technical, some are business opportunities, and some are regulatory questions. There must be recognition among cryptocurrency proponents that maturation of the industry will require cooperation in many cases with incumbents and regulators,” added Werbach.

Hosanagar cautions that while decentralization offers significant value — and a significant number of miners/validators must verify the transaction for it to be validated — it is still susceptible to collusion. If one or a few companies running lots of miners/validators in a small network collude, they can affect the sanctity of the network. The big risk with cryptocurrencies, he added, is that most activity as of today is ultimately tied to speculation. It’s important for cryptocurrencies to discover a “killer app soon so there is some underlying value created beyond speculation of its future value,” Hosanagar concludes.

The Way Ahead?

Given all these challenges, what is the current mindset in the financial sector towards adopting these new technologies? And, importantly, should one push for wide acceptance and deployment, or is there need for them to stabilize first?

According to Werbach, “It’s not an either-or” choice. Cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology in general, he noted, are immature currently. However, there are some areas where they are already able to be deployed effectively. The best way to work through today’s problems, is “to build working systems and see where difficulties arise,” Werbach said. Looking ahead, integration with law, regulation and governance will be critical. Blockchain and cryptocurrencies represent a new form of trust, he added. They will only succeed if they become sufficiently trustworthy, beyond the basic security of the distributed ledgers. “Law, regulation and governance are three major mechanisms to produce trustworthy systems that scale up to society-wide adoption. We need to find ways to address the legitimate concerns of governments without overly restricting the innovations that blockchain technology enables. I’m optimistic about that process over time.”

“We need to find ways to address the legitimate concerns of governments without overly restricting the innovations that blockchain technology enables.”–Kevin Werbach

Walch noted that while there are claims that some consortia are putting ‘blockchain’ systems into production, in many cases it appears that what they are calling a blockchain bears little to no resemblance to the original blockchain technology behind Bitcoin. In many instances, she said, existing shared databases are being called ‘blockchain’ for marketing purposes. “If people do use something they call DLT or blockchain technology in important financial systems, my hope is that they make the decision based on actual capabilities of the tech rather than its widely hyped and generally overstated capabilities,” Walch said. “Permissioned blockchains, which are the variation most likely to be used for financial systems recordkeeping, are very different from public blockchains like Bitcoin or Ethereum. I hope that a more modest and accurate understanding of the actual characteristics of permissioned blockchains sinks in before they are widely adopted.”

Regarding cryptocurrencies or cryptoassets, Walch said that the financial sector’s interest is “less about recordkeeping and more about a new financial asset that it can make money off of.” She pointed out that at present there is no clarity on how power and accountability work in these systems. The ongoing operation of crypto systems and the value they embed and support is reliant on the competence of, and ethical behavior by, unaccountable software developers and validators. “The financial sector believes it understands and can manage the risks of cryptoassets, but I am less certain and worry that hubris and greed are driving the push to create cryptoassets as a real asset class. This has been a bad mixture in the past,” says Walch. “I think it would be more responsible to let cryptosystems exist on their own for a while longer to let more of the kinks get worked out — if they can be; I’m not sure the governance ones can — rather than to rapidly integrate them into the financial system as we seem to be doing.”

“I … worry that hubris and greed are driving the push to create cryptoassets as a real asset class.”–Angela Walch

Conversely, Weber and Novocin feel that the financial industry is cautious about the new DLT technology. According to them, to build confidence in new blockchain systems there needs to be transparency around how the processes work and what the benefits are, and in order to secure adoption, they need to be straightforward to use. “Pundits have drawn parallels to the open source Linux operating system. Although only a few individuals use Linux directly, it quietly runs the vast majority of servers and cloud processors across the world. Similarly, early adoption of blockchain will likely happen in the background of business processes. Companies should get involved now, even if it is just to experiment with the concepts. By gaining familiarity with these new tools, they will be ready as the space continues to develop.”

Weber and Novocin expect that in the next few years, many more businesses will implement private blockchains to improve the transparency and traceability of their financial operations, supply chains, inventory management systems and other internal business systems. Clearer standards will be adopted and a few high-profile projects will emerge. Meanwhile, they said, R&D will continue among the many decentralized blockchain projects to invent more scalable public ledgers whether it be blockchain, Tangle, Hashgraph or something new. “Work is needed on better and more efficient consensus models, whether it be a new form of proof-of-stake or proof-of-work, or something else. There are many established groups, startups, companies and research teams that organizations can join, partner with, or support in order to contribute to research and expand their capabilities.”




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July 16, 2020