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What I Learned from Warren Buffett | How Warren Buffett decides if something is a good investment.

by Bill Gates.

arren Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist, Roger Lowenstein (New York: Random House, 1995).

Roger Lowenstein begins his new biography of Warren Buffett with a disclaimer. He reveals that he is a longtime investor in Berkshire Hathaway, the company that under Buffett’s guidance has seen its share price rise in 33 years from $7.60 to approximately $30,000.

In reviewing Lowenstein’s book, I must begin with a disclaimer, too. I can’t be neutral or dispassionate about Warren Buffett, because we’re close friends. We recently vacationed together in China with our wives. I think his jokes are all funny. I think his dietary practices—lots of burgers and Cokes—are excellent. In short, I’m a fan.

It’s easy to be a fan of Warren’s, and doubtless many readers of Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist will join the growing ranks. Lowenstein’s book is a straightforward account of Buffett’s remarkable life. It doesn’t fully convey what a fun, humble, charming guy Warren is, but his uniqueness comes across. No one is likely to come away from it saying, “Oh, I’m like that guy.”

The broad outlines of Warren’s career are well known, and the book offers enjoyable detail. Lowenstein traces Warren’s life from his birth in Omaha, Nebraska in 1930 to his first stock purchase at age 11, and from his study of the securities profession under Columbia University’s legendary Benjamin Graham to his founding of the Buffett Partnership at age 25. The author describes Buffett’s secretiveness about the stocks he picked for the partnership, and his contrasting openness about his guiding principle, which is to buy stocks at bargain-basement prices and hold them patiently. As Warren once explained in a letter to his partners, “This is the cornerstone of our investment philosophy: Never count on making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results.”

Lowenstein describes how Warren took control of Berkshire Hathaway and cash-cowed its dying textile business in order to purchase stock in other companies. The book traces how Berkshire evolved into a holding company and how its investment philosophy evolved as Warren learned to look beyond financial data and recognize the economic potential of unique franchises like dominant newspapers. Today Berkshire owns companies such as See’s Candy Shops, the Buffalo News, and World Book International, as well as major positions in companies such as American Express, Capital Cities/ABC (now Disney), Coca-Cola, Gannett, Gillette, and the Washington Post Company. It also is a major insurer that includes GEICO Corporation in its holdings.

Readers are likely to come away from the book’s description of Buffett’s life and investment objectives feeling better educated about investing and business, but whether those lessons will translate into great investment results is less than certain. Warren’s gift is being able to think ahead of the crowd, and it requires more than taking Warren’s aphorisms to heart to accomplish that—although Warren is full of aphorisms well worth taking to heart.

For example, Warren likes to say that there are no called strikes in investing. Strikes occur only when you swing and miss. When you’re at bat, you shouldn’t concern yourself with every pitch, nor should you regret good pitches that you don’t swing at. In other words, you don’t have to have an opinion about every stock or other investment opportunity, nor should you feel bad if a stock you didn’t pick goes up dramatically. Warren says that in your lifetime you should swing at only a couple dozen pitches, and he advises doing careful homework so that the few swings you do take are hits.
For example, Warren likes to say that there are no called strikes in investing. Strikes occur only when you swing and miss.

Warren follows his own advice: When he invests in a company, he likes to read all of its annual reports going back as far as he can. He looks at how the company has progressed and what its strategy is. He investigates thoroughly and acts deliberately—and infrequently. Once he has purchased a company or shares in a company, he is loath to sell.

His penchant for long-term investments is reflected in another of his aphorisms: “You should invest in a business that even a fool can run, because someday a fool will.”

He doesn’t believe in businesses that rely for their success on every employee being excellent. Nor does he believe that great people help all that much when the fundamentals of a business are bad. He says that when good management is brought into a fundamentally bad business, it’s the reputation of the business that remains intact.

Warren likes to say that a good business is like a castle and you’ve got to think every day, Is the management growing the size of the moat? Or is the moat shrinking? Great businesses are not all that common, and finding them is hard. Unusual factors combine to create the moats that shelter certain companies from some of the rigors of competition. Warren is superb at recognizing these franchises.

Warren installs strong managers in the companies Berkshire owns and tends to leave them pretty much alone. His basic proposition to managers is that to the degree that a company spins off cash, which good businesses do, the managers can trust Warren to invest it wisely. He doesn’t encourage managers to diversify. Managers are expected to concentrate on the businesses they know well so that Warren is free to concentrate on what he does well: investing.

My own reaction upon meeting Warren took me by surprise. Whenever somebody says to me, “Meet so-and-so; he’s the smartest guy ever” or “You’ve got to meet my friend so-and-so; he’s the best at such and such,” my defenses go up. Most people are quick to conclude that someone or something they encounter personally is exceptional. This is just human nature. Everybody wants to know someone or something superlative. As a result, people overestimate the merit of that to which they’ve been exposed. So the fact that people called Warren Buffett unique didn’t impress me much.

In fact, I was extremely skeptical when my mother suggested I take a day away from work to meet him on July 5, 1991. What were he and I supposed to talk about, P/E ratios? I mean, spend all day with a guy who just picks stocks? Especially when there’s lots of work to do? Are you kidding?

I said to my mom, “I’m working on July fifth. We’re really busy. I am sorry.”
She said, “Kay Graham will be there.”

Now, that caught my attention. I had never met Graham, but I was impressed with how well she had run the Washington Post Company and by her newspaper’s role in political history. As it happened, Kay and Warren had been great friends for years, and one of Warren’s shrewdest investments was in Post stock. Kay, Warren, and a couple of prominent journalists happened to be in the Seattle area together, and owing to an unusual circumstance they all squeezed into a little car that morning for a long drive to my family’s weekend home, which is a couple of hours outside the city. Some of the people in the car were as skeptical as I was. “We’re going to spend the whole day at these people’s house?” someone in the cramped car asked. “What are we going to do all day?”

My mom was really hard core that I come. “I’ll stay a couple of hours, and then I’m going back,” I told her.

When I arrived, Warren and I began talking about how the newspaper business was being changed by the arrival of retailers who did less advertising. Then he started asking me about IBM: “If you were building IBM from scratch, how would it look different? What are the growth businesses for IBM? What has changed for them?”

He asked good questions and told educational stories. There’s nothing I like so much as learning, and I had never met anyone who thought about business in such a clear way. On that first day, he introduced me to an intriguing analytic exercise that he does. He’ll choose a year—say, 1970—and examine the ten highest market-capitalization companies from around then. Then he’ll go forward to 1990 and look at how those companies fared. His enthusiasm for the exercise was contagious. I stayed the whole day, and before he drove off with his friends, I even agreed to fly out to Nebraska to watch a football game with him.

When you are with Warren, you can tell how much he loves his work. It comes across in many ways. When he explains stuff, it’s never “Hey, I’m smart about this and I’m going to impress you.” It’s more like “This is so interesting and it’s actually very simple. I’ll just explain it to you and you’ll realize how dumb it was that it took me a long time to figure it out.” And when he shares it with you, using his keen sense of humor to help make the point, it does seem simple.

Warren and I have the most fun when we’re taking the same data that everybody else has and coming up with new ways of looking at them that are both novel and, in a sense, obvious. Each of us tries to do this all the time for our respective companies, but it’s particularly enjoyable and stimulating to discuss these insights with each other.

We are quite candid and not at all adversarial. Our business interests don’t overlap much, although his printed World Book Encyclopedia competes with my electronic Microsoft Encarta. Warren stays away from technology companies because he likes investments in which he can predict winners a decade in advance—an almost impossible feat when it comes to technology. Unfortunately for Warren, the world of technology knows no boundaries. Over time, most business assets will be affected by technology’s broad reach—although Gillette, Coca-Cola, and See’s should be safe.
One area in which we do joust now and then is mathematics. Once Warren presented me with four unusual dice, each with a unique combination of numbers (from 0 to 12) on its sides. He proposed that we each choose one of the dice, discard the third and fourth, and wager on who would roll the highest number most often. He graciously offered to let me choose my die first.

“Okay,” Warren said, “because you get to pick first, what kind of odds will you give me?”

I knew something was up. “Let me look at those dice,” I said.

After studying the numbers on their faces for a moment, I said, “This is a losing proposition. You choose first.”

Once he chose a die, it took me a couple of minutes to figure out which of the three remaining dice to choose in response. Because of the careful selection of the numbers on each die, they were nontransitive. Each of the four dice could be beaten by one of the others: die A would tend to beat die B, die B would tend to beat die C, die C would tend to beat die D, and die D would tend to beat die A. This meant that there was no winning first choice of a die, only a winning second choice. It was counterintuitive, like a lot of things in the business world.

Warren is great with numbers, and I love math, too. But being good with numbers doesn’t necessarily correlate with being a good investor. Warren doesn’t outperform other investors because he computes odds better. That’s not it at all. Warren never makes an investment where the difference between doing it and not doing it relies on the second digit of computation. He doesn’t invest—take a swing of the bat—unless the opportunity appears unbelievably good.

One habit of Warren’s that I admire is that he keeps his schedule free of meetings. He’s good at saying no to things. He knows what he likes to do—and what he does, he does unbelievably well. He likes to sit in his office and read and think. There are a few things he’ll do beyond that, but not many. One point that Lowenstein makes that is absolutely true is that Warren is a creature of habit. He grew up in Omaha, and he wants to stay in Omaha. He has gotten to know a certain set of people, and he’d like to spend time with those people. He’s not a person who seeks out exotic new things. Warren, who just turned 65, still lives in the Omaha house he bought for himself at age 27.

His affinity for routine extends to his investment practices, too. Warren sticks to companies that he is comfortable with. He doesn’t do much investing outside the United States. There are a few companies that he has decided are great long-term investments. And despite the self-evident mathematics that there must be a price that fully anticipates all the good work that those companies will do in the future, he just won’t sell their stock no matter what the price is. I think his reluctance to sell is more philosophical than optimization driven, but who am I to second-guess the world’s most successful investor? Warren’s reluctance to sell fits in with his other tendencies.
Warren and I share certain values. He and I both feel lucky that we were born into an era in which our skills have turned out to be so remunerative. Had we been born at a different time, our skills might not have had much value. Since we don’t plan on spending much of what we have accumulated, we can make sure our wealth benefits society. In a sense, we’re both working for charity. In any case, our heirs will get only a small portion of what we accumulate, because we both believe that passing on huge wealth to children isn’t in their or society’s interest. Warren likes to say that he wants to give his children enough money for them to do anything but not enough for them to do nothing. I thought about this before I met Warren, and hearing him articulate it crystallized my feelings.

Lowenstein is a good collector of facts, and Buffett is competently written. Warren has told me that the book is in most respects accurate. He says he is going to write his own book someday, but given how much he loves to work and how hard it is to write a book (based on my personal experience), I think it will be a number of years before he does it. When it comes out, I am sure it will be one of the most valuable business books ever.

Already, Warren’s letters to shareholders are among the best of business literature.

Already, Warren’s letters to shareholders in the Berkshire Hathaway annual reports are among the best of business literature. Much of Lowenstein’s analysis comes from those letters, as it should. If, after reading Buffett, you’re intrigued by the man and his methods, I strongly commend the annual reports to you—even ones from 10 or 15 years ago. They are available in many libraries.

Other books have been written about Warren Buffett and his investment strategy, but until Warren writes his own book, this is the one to read.

source : https://hbr.org/1996/01/what-i-learned-from-warren-buffett.
August 14, 2020

How Warren Buffett Makes Decisions – The Secret to His Investing Success.

By Michael Lewis.

Warren Buffett is considered by many to be the most successful stock investor ever. Despite the occasional mistake, Buffett’s investing strategies are unrivaled. In 1956, at age 26, his net worth was estimated at $140,000. MarketWatch estimated his net worth at the end of 2016 to be $73.1 billion, an astounding compound annual growth rate of 24.5%. By contrast, the S&P 500 has grown at an average rate of 6.79% and most mutual funds have failed to equal the annual S&P 500 return consistently.

Buffett has achieved these returns while most of his competition failed. According to John Bogle, one of the founders and former Chairman of The Vanguard Group, “The evidence is compelling that equity fund returns lag the stock market by a substantial amount, largely accounted for by cost, and that fund investor returns lag fund returns by a substantial amount, largely accounted for by counterproductive market timing and fund selection.”

Since the evidence shows that Buffet has been an exceptional investor, market observers and psychologists have searched for an explanation to his success. Why has Warren Buffett achieved extraordinary gains compared to his peers? What is his secret?

A Long-Term Perspective. Why Some People Are More Successful Than Others.
Philosophers and scientists have long sought to determine why some people are more successful than others at building wealth. Their findings are varied and often contradictory.

For centuries, people believed their fate, including wealth and status, depended upon the capricious favor of pagan gods – more specifically, the favor of Tyche (Greek) or Fortuna (Roman). Expansion of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions and their concepts of “free will” led to the general belief that individuals could control their destiny through their actions, or lack thereof.

Modern science, specifically psychology and neuroscience, advanced a theory of biological determinants that control human decisions and actions. This theory suggests that free will might not be as “free” as previously thought. In other words, we may be predisposed to certain behaviors that affect the ways we process information and make decisions.

Evolutionary biologists and psychologists have developed a variety of different theories to explain human decision-making. Some claim that the ability to make superior decisions with favorable outcomes is the result of eons of natural selection, which favors individuals with exceptional genetics, such as those with high IQs.

Despite the perception that a high IQ is necessary for building wealth, study after study indicates that the link between super-intelligence and financial success is dubious at best:

Dr. Jay Zagorsky’s study in the Intelligence Journal found no strong relationship between total wealth and intelligence: “People don’t become rich just because they are smart.”
Mensa members rank in the top 2% of the brightest people on earth, but most are not rich and are “certainly not the top 1% financially,” according to an organization spokesperson. A study by Eleanor Laise of the Mensa Investment Club noted that the fund averaged 2.5% per annum for a 15-year period, while the S&P 500 averaged 15.3% during the same time. One member admitted that “we can screw up faster than anyone,” while another described their investment strategy as “buy low, sell lower.”
Buffett has never claimed to be a genius. When asked what he would teach the next generation of investors at the 2009 Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, he replied, “In the investing business, if you have an IQ of 150, sell 30 points to someone else. You do not need to be a genius . . . It’s not a complicated game; you don’t need to understand math. It’s simple, but not easy.”

He later expanded the thought: “If calculus or algebra were required to be a great investor, I’d have to go back to delivering newspapers.”

Economists’ Rational Man.
Economists have historically based their models upon the presumption that humans make logical decisions. In other words, a person faced with a choice balances certainties against risks. The theory of expected value presumes that people facing choices will choose the one that has the largest combination of expected success (probability) and value (impact).

A rational person would always model the industrious ant in Aesop’s fable, not the insouciant grasshopper. The idea that people would make decisions contrary to their interests is inconceivable to economists.

To be fair, most economists recognize the flaws in their models. Swedish economist Lars Syll notes that “a theoretical model is nothing more than an argument that a set of conclusions follows from a fixed set of assumptions.”

Economists presume stable systems and simple assumptions, while the real world is in constant flux. Paraphrasing H.L Mencken’s famous quote, there is always a simple economic model [well-known solution] for every human problem. This notion is neat, plausible, and wrong.

Psychologists’ Natural Man.
According to Harvard professor Daniel Lieberman, humans are naturally inclined to seek the solutions that require the least expenditure of energy.

In the real world, we have difficulty deferring immediate gratification for future security, selecting investments best suited to our long-term goals and risk profile, and acting in our best financial interests. Psychological research suggests that the difficulty is rooted in our brains – how we think and make decisions.

Researchers Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor postulate that humans are “cognitive misers,” preferring to do as little thinking as possible. The brain uses more energy than any other human organ, accounting for up to 20% of the body’s total intake.

When decisions involve issues more remote from our current state in distance or time, there is a tendency to defer making a choice. This impulse accounts for the failure of people to save in the present since the payoff is years in the future.

As far as we know, Mr. Buffett’ brain is similar to other investors and he experiences the same impulses and anxieties as others. While he experiences the tensions that arise in everyone when making decisions, he has learned to control impulses and make reasoned, rational decisions.

Our Two-Brain System.
The studies by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky provide new insight into decision-making, perhaps the key to Buffett’s success. They theorize that each human uses two systems of mental processing (System 1 and System 2) that work together seamlessly most of the time. Khaneman’s book, “Thinking, Fast and Slow,” outlines these two systems.

System 1 – Think Fast.
System 1, also referred to as the “emotional brain,” developed as the limbic system in the brain of early humans. Sometimes called the “mammalian brain,” it includes the amygdala, the organ where emotions and memories arise.

Neuroscientist Paul MacLean hypothesized that the limbic system was one of the first steps in the evolution of the human brain, developed as part of its fight or flight circuitry. Through necessity, our primitive ancestors had to react quickly to danger when seconds could mean escape or death.

The emotional brain is always active, capable of making quick decisions with scant information and conscious effort. It continuously makes and remakes models – heuristic frames – of the world around it, relying on the senses and memories of past events.

For example, an experienced driver coordinates steering and speed of an automobile on an empty highway almost effortlessly, even casually. The driver can simultaneously carry on conversations with passengers or listen to the radio without losing control of the vehicle. The driver is relying on the decisions of System 1.

The emotional brain is also the source of intuition, that “inner voice” or gut feeling we sometimes get without being consciously aware of the underlying reasons for its occurrence. We rely primarily on this system for the hundreds of everyday decisions we make – what to wear, where to sit, identifying a friend. Paradoxically, System 1 is a source of creativity as well as habits.

System 2 – Think Slow.
System 2, also called the “logical brain,” is slower, more deliberate, and analytical, rationally balancing the benefits and costs of each choice using all the available information.

System 2 decisions take place in the latest evolutionary addition to the brain – the neocortex. It is believed to be the center of humans’ extraordinary cognitive activity. System 2 was slower to evolve in humans and requires more energy to exercise, indicating the old saw “Thinking is hard” is a fact.

Kahneman characterizes System 2 as “the conscious, reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and do.” It is in charge of decisions about the future, while System 1 is more active in the moment. While our emotional brain can generate complex patterns of ideas, it is also freewheeling, impulsive, and often inappropriate.

Fortunately, System 1 works well most of the time; its models of everyday situations are accurate, its short-term predictions are usually correct, and its initial reactions to challenges are swift and mostly appropriate.

System 2 is more controlled, rule-based, and analytical, continuously monitoring the quality of the answers provided by System 1. Our logical brain becomes active when it needs to override an automatic judgment of System 1.

For example, the earlier driver proceeding casually down the road is more focused when passing a semi-truck on a narrow two-lane road or in heavy traffic, actively processing the changing conditions and responding with deliberate actions. His or her mental effort is accompanied by detectable physical changes, such as tensed muscles, increased heart rate, and dilated pupils. In these circumstances, System 2 is in charge.

The logical brain normally functions in low-effort mode, always in reserve until System 1 encounters a problem it cannot solve or is required to act in a way that doesn’t come naturally. Solving for the product of 37 x 82 requires the deliberate processes of System 2, while the answer to a simple addition problem, such as the sum of 2 + 2, is a System 1 function. The answer is not calculated, but summoned from memory.

Neuropsychologists Abigail Baird and Jonathan Fugelsang’s 2004 study indicates that System 2 does not fully develop until adulthood. Their findings suggest the reason that adolescents are more likely to engage in risky behavior is because they lack the mental hardware to weigh decisions rationally. For most people, the two systems work together seamlessly, transitioning from one to the other as needed.

The Buffett Style.
The Oracle of Omaha’s key to investing is understanding and coordinating the two systems of decision-making. Buffett relies upon System 1 to intuitively seek out investments he finds attractive and understands.

When deciding on a possible investment, he recommends, “If you need a computer or a calculator to decide whether to invest, then don’t do it – invest in something that shouts at you – if it is not obvious, walk away . . . If you don’t know the business, the financials won’t help at all.”

Avoid the Traps of Thinking Fast.
Master investors like Buffett simplify their decisions by relying upon System 1, and it serves them well in most cases. However, they recognize that their emotional decision-making system is also prone to biases and errors, including:

Mental Framing.
Our brains, equipped with millions of sensory inputs, create interpretive mental “frames” or filters to make sense of data. These mental filters help us understand and respond to the events around us. Framing is a heuristic – a mental shortcut – that provides a quick, easy way to process information. Unfortunately, framing can also provide a limited, simplistic view of reality that can lead to flawed decisions.

The choices we make depend on our perspective, or the frames surrounding the problem. For example, research shows that people are likely to proceed with a decision if the outcome is presented with a 50% chance of success and decline if the consequence is expressed with a 50% chance of failure, even though the probability is the same in either case.

Most investors incorrectly frame stock investments by thinking of the stock market as a stream of electronic bits of data independent of the underlying businesses the data represents. The constant flow of information about prices, economies, and expert opinions triggers our emotional brains and stimulates quick decisions to reap profits (pleasure) or prevent loss (pain).

Buffett recommends investors not think of an investment in stock as “a piece of paper whose price wiggles around daily” and is a candidate for sale whenever you get nervous.

Short-term thinking – System 1 – often leads to trading stocks, not investing in companies. Day traders – those who buy and sell stocks within a single market session – are unusually unsuccessful, according to day trading studies by the University of California-Berkeley:

80% of all day traders quit within the first two years.
Active traders underperform the stock market average by 6.5% annually.
Only 1.6% of day traders make a net profit each year.
Financial data is especially susceptible to framing. Companies always express earnings and losses positively, either as an increase compared to past results or a smaller loss than previous periods. Trends can be manipulated based upon the comparison point and time interval.

Even the words we use to describe a choice establish a frame for assessing value. Characterizations like “high growth,” “turnaround,” or “cyclical” trigger the subconscious stereotypes we have for such terms without regard to the underlying financial data.

Framing can lead rational people to make irrational decisions based upon their projections of the outcome. This accounts for the difference between economics’ rational man and psychology’s natural man.

Buffett has learned to frame his investment opportunities appropriately to avoid short-term, arbitrary outcomes:

“We [Berkshire Hathaway] select such investments on a long-term basis, weighing the same factors as would be involved in the purchase of 100% of an operating business.”
“When we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever.”
“If you aren’t willing to own a stock for 10 years, don’t even think about owning it 10 minutes.”
Loss Aversion.
Kahneman and Tversky determined that in human decision-making, losses loom larger than gains. Their experiments suggest that the pain of loss is twice as a great as the pleasure from gain. This feeling arises in the amygdala, which is responsible for generating fearful emotions and memories of painful associations.

The fact that investors are more likely to sell stocks with profit than those with a loss, when the converse strategy would be more logical, is evidence of the power of loss aversion.

While Buffett sells his positions infrequently, he cuts his losses when he realizes he has made a judgment error. In 2016, Buffett substantially reduced or liquidated his position in three companies, because he believed they had lost their competitive edge:

Wal-Mart: Despite his regrets that he had not purchased more shares earlier, he has been a long-time investor in the company. The rationale for the recent sales is thought to be due to the transition of the retail market from bricks-and-mortar stores to online. A Pew Research Center study found almost 80% of Americans today are online shoppers versus 22% in 2000.
Deere & Co: Buffett’s initial purchases of the agricultural equipment manufacturer began in the third quarter of 2012. By 2016, he owned almost 22-million shares with an average cost of less than $80 per share. He liquidated his shares during the last two quarters of 2016 when prices were more than $100 per share. Buffett may have felt that farm income, having fallen by half since 2013 due to worldwide bumper crops, was unlikely to improve, leaving the premier provider of agricultural equipment unable to continue to expand its profits.
Verizon: Having owned the stock since 2014, he liquidated his entire position in 2016, due to a loss of confidence in management after the company’s questionable acquisition of Yahoo and the continued turmoil in the wireless carrier market.
Our distaste for losses can create anxiety and trick us into acting prematurely because we fear being left out in a rising market or staying too long in a bear market. Buffett and Munger practice “assiduity – the ability to sit on your ass and do nothing until a great opportunity presents itself.”

Representativeness.
People tend to ignore statistics and focus on stereotypes. An example in the Association of Psychological Science Journal illustrates this common bias. When asked to select the proper occupation of a shy, withdrawn man who takes little interest in the real world from a list including farmer, salesman, pilot, doctor, and librarian, most people incorrectly chose librarian. Their decision ignores the obvious: there are many more farmers in the world than librarians.

Buffett focuses on finding the “inevitables” – great companies with insurmountable advantages – rather than following conventional wisdom and accepted patterns of thinking favored by System 1’s decision-making process. In his 1996 letter to investors, he defines Coca-Cola and Gillette as two companies that “will dominate their fields worldwide for an investment lifetime.”

He is especially wary of “imposters” – those companies that seem invincible but lack real competitive advantage. For every inevitable, there are dozens of imposters. According to Buffett, General Motors, IBM, and Sears lost their seemingly insurmountable advantages when values declined in “the presence of hubris or of boredom that caused the attention of the managers to wander.”

Buffett recognizes that companies in high-tech or embryonic industries capture our imaginations – and excite our emotional brains – with their promise of extraordinary gains. However, he prefers investments where he is “certain of a good result [rather] than hopeful of a great one” – an example of the logical brain at work.

Anchoring.
Evolution is the reason humans rely too heavily on the first or a single bit of information they receive – their “first impression.” In a world of deadly perils, delaying action can lead to pain or death. Therefore, first impressions linger in our minds and affect subsequent decisions. We subconsciously believe that what happened in the past will happen in the future, leading us to exaggerate the importance of the initial purchase price in subsequent decisions to sell a security.

Investors unknowingly make decisions based on anchoring data, such as previous stock prices, past years’ earnings, consensus analyst projections or expert opinions, and prevailing attitudes about the direction of stock prices, whether in a bear or bull market. While some characterize this effect as following a trend, it is a System 1 shortcut based on partial information, rather than the result of System 2 analysis.

Buffett often goes against the trend of popular opinion, recognizing that “most people get interested in stocks when everyone else is. The time to get interested is when no one else is. You can’t buy what is popular and do well.” When making a decision based on historical data, he notes, “If past history was all that is needed to play the game of money, the richest people would be librarians.”

Buffett’s approach is neither to follow the herd nor purposely do the opposite of the consensus. Whether people concur with his analysis isn’t important. His goal is simple: acquire, at a reasonable price, a business with excellent economics and able, honest management.

Despite considering IBM an “imposter” in 1996, Berkshire Hathaway began acquiring the stock in 2011, consistently adding to Buffett’s position over the years. By the end of the first quarter in 2017, Berkshire owned more than 8% of the outstanding shares with a value greater than $14 billion.

While his analysis remains confidential, Buffett believes that the investors have discounted the future of IBM too severely and failed to note its transition to a cloud-based business might lead to brighter growth prospects and a high degree of customer retention. Also, the company pays a dividend almost twice the level of the S&P 500 and actively repurchases shares on the open market.

The growing IBM position – quadrupling since the initial purchase – is evidence that Buffett isn’t afraid to take action when he is comfortable with his analysis: “Opportunities come infrequently. When it rains gold, put out the bucket, not the thimble.”

Availability.
Humans tend to estimate the likelihood of an event occurring based on the ease with which it comes to mind. For example, a 2008 study of State lottery sales showed that stores that sell a publicized, winning lottery ticket experience a 12% to 38% increase in sales for up to 40 weeks following the announcement of the winner.

People visit stores selling a winning ticket more often due to the easy recall of the win, and a bias that the location is “lucky” and more likely to produce another winning ticket than a more convenient store down the street.

This bias frequently affects decisions about stock investments. In other words, investor perceptions lag reality. Momentum, whether upward or downward, continues well past the emergence of new facts. Investors with losses are slow to reinvest, often sitting on the sidelines until prices have recovered most of their decline (irrational pessimism).

Conversely, reinforcement from a bull market encourages continued purchasing even after the economic cycle turns down (irrational optimism). Therefore, investors tend to buy when prices are high and sell when they are low.

The S&P 500 fell 57% between late 2007 and March 2009, devastating investor portfolios and liquidating stocks and mutual funds. Even though the index had recovered its losses by mid-2012, individual investors had not returned to equity investments, either staying in cash or purchasing less risky bonds.

At the time, Liz Ann Sonders, Chief Investment Strategist at Charles Schwab & Co., noted, “Even three-and-a-half years into this bull market and the gains we’ve seen since June [2012], it has not turned this psychology [of fear] around.” In other words, many individuals took the loss but did not participate in the subsequent recovery.

Buffett has always tried to follow the advice of his mentor, Benjamin Graham, who said, “Buy not on optimism [or sell due to pessimism], but on arithmetic.” Graham advocated objective analysis, not emotions, when buying or selling stocks: “In the short run, the market is a voting machine [emotional], but in the long run it is a weighing machine [logical].”

Affect.
We tend to assess probabilities based on our feelings about the options. In other words, we judge an option less risky solely because we favor it and vice versa. This bias can lead people to buy stock in their employer when other investments would be more appropriate for their goals. Overconfidence in one’s ability magnifies the negative impact of affect.

For example, Buffett invested $350 million in preferred stock of U.S. Airways in 1989, despite his belief that airlines and airline manufacturers had historically been a death trap for investors. The investment followed a dinner with Ed Colodny, the CEO of the airline, who impressed Buffett. Certain that the preferred stock was safe and the airline had a competitive seat cost (around 12 cents per mile), he made the investment.

Buffett later admitted his analysis “was superficial and wrong,” perhaps due to hubris and his like for Colodny. An upstart Texas airline (Southwest Airlines) subsequently upset the competitive balance in the industry with seat costs of 8 cents per mile, causing Berkshire Hathaway to write down its investment by 75%.

Buffett was lucky to make a significant profit on the investment ($216 million), primarily because the airline subsequently and unexpectedly returned to profitability and was able to pay the accrued dividends and redeem its preferred stock.

Final Word.
Mr. Buffett’s investment style has been criticized by many over the decades. Trend followers and traders are especially critical of his record and philosophy, claiming that his results are the result of “luck, given the relatively few trades that made him so wealthy.”

Hedge fund manager Michael Steinhardt, who Forbes called “Wall Street’s Greatest Trader,” said during a CNBC interview that Buffett is “the greatest PR person of all time. And he has managed to achieve a snow job that has conned virtually everyone in the press to my knowledge.”

Before following the advice of those who are quick to condemn Buffett’s investment style, it should be noted that no investment manager has come close to rivaling Buffet’s record over the past 60 years. While Steinhardt’s returns are similar to those of Buffett, his were for a period of 28 years – less than one-half of Buffett’s cycle.

Despite their antipathy, both men would agree that System 2 decision-making is critical to investment success. Steinhardt, in his autobiography “No Bull: My Life In and Out of Markets,” said that his results required “knowing more and perceiving the situation better than others did . . . Reaching a level of understanding that allows one to feel competitively informed well ahead of changes in ‘street’ views, even anticipating minor stock price changes, may justify at times making unpopular investments.”

Buffett appears to agree, insisting on taking the time for introspection and thought. “I insist on a lot of time being spent, almost every day, to just sit and think. That is very uncommon in American business. I read and think. So I do more reading and thinking, and make fewer impulsive decisions than most people in business.”

Do you take the time to gather facts and make carefully analyzed investment decisions? Perhaps you are more comfortable going with the flow. What is your decision-making preference and how has it worked out for you thus far?
Do you know anyone who has owned the same stock for 20 years? Warren Buffett has held three stocks – Coca-Cola, Wells Fargo, and American Express – for more than 20 years. He has owned one stock – Moody’s – for 15 years, and three other stocks – Proctor & Gamble, Wal-Mart, and U.S. Bancorp – for over a decade.

To be sure, Mr. Buffett’s 50-year track record is not perfect, as he has pointed out from time to time:

Berkshire Hathaway: Pique at CEO Seabird Stanton motivated his takeover of the failing textile company. Buffett later admitted the purchase was “the dumbest stock I ever bought.”
Energy Future Holding: Buffett lost a billion dollars in bonds of the bankrupt Texas electric utility. He admitted he made a huge mistake not consulting his long-term business partner Charlie Munger before closing the purchase: “I would be unwilling to share the credit for my decision to invest with anyone else. That was just a mistake – a significant mistake.”
Wal-Mart: At the 2003 Berkshire Hathaway shareholder meeting, Buffet admitted his attempt to time the market had backfired: “We bought a little, and it moved up a little, and I thought maybe it would come back. That thumb-sucking has cost us in the current area of $10 billion.”
Even with these mistakes, Buffett has focused on making big bets that he intends to hold for decades to come. A longer time horizon has allowed him to take advantage of opportunities few others have the patience for. But how has he been able to make these successful bets in the first place?

source : https://www.moneycrashers.com/warren-buffett-decisions-secret-investing-success.
August 14, 2020

2 simple ways Warren Buffett decides what to invest in | How Warren Buffett decides if something is a good investment.

By Emmie Martin.

It seems like every week there’s a new flashy Silicon Valley start-up announcing its IPO, and it’s tempting to want to get in on the action. But is buying stock in a newly public company the best idea? When it comes to investing, Berkshire Hathaway CEO Warren Buffett doesn’t have a complicated method for choosing what to buy. Instead, he keeps things simple by following a few steadfast guidelines.

After all, “the fundamentals won’t change,” he told CNBC’s Becky Quick during an interview on “Squawk Box” in February. “You’re not going to discover anything new about investments in the next 50 or 100 years.”

Here are two ways the Oracle of Omaha decides a business is worth investing in.

1. The company has long-term value.
Buffett looks for businesses that will continue to have a competitive advantage decades down the line, not just in the moment. “Nobody buys a farm based on whether they think it’s going to rain next year,” he said on “Squawk Box” in 2018. “They buy it because they think it’s a good investment over 10 or 20 years.”

For example, he purchased See’s Candies with longtime business partner Charlie Munger in 1972 and spent more than $1 billion on Coca-Cola stock in 1988 — both of which turned out to be good bets he still owns today.

“Put together a portfolio of companies whose aggregate earnings march upward over the years, and so also will the portfolio’s market value,” Buffett wrote in his 1996 letter to shareholders. “If you aren’t willing to own a stock for 10 years, don’t even think about owning it for 10 minutes.”

2. He understands how the business works.
Buffett doesn’t put money into anything he doesn’t understand. “You have to learn how to value businesses and know the ones that are within your circle of competence and the ones that are outside,” Buffett told Quick in February.

That’s because it’s crucial for investors to be able to confidently assess the businesses they hold. “Intelligent investing is not complex, though that is far from saying that it is easy,” Buffett wrote in his 1996 annual shareholders’ letter. “What an investor needs is the ability to correctly evaluate selected businesses. Note that word ‘selected’: You don’t have to be an expert on every company, or even many. You only have to be able to evaluate companies within your circle of competence.

“The size of that circle is not very important; knowing its boundaries, however, is vital.”

You have to learn how to value businesses and know the ones that are within your circle of competence and the ones that are outside.

It’s important to remember that investing in the stock market always carries risk and for many people, investing in individual companies isn’t the smartest choice. You should talk to a trusted financial advisor before making any major decisions.

For many investors, Buffett recommends low-risk index funds, which he calls the “thing that makes the most sense practically all of the time” for retirement savings.

He favors index funds, in part, because they take the guesswork out of investing. “The trick is not to pick the right company,” Buffett told CNBC’s “On The Money” in 2017. “The trick is to essentially buy all the big companies through the S&P 500 and to do it consistently.”

In fact, after he’s gone, he has said that he’s instructed the trustee in charge of his estate to invest 90% of his money into the S&P 500 for his wife.

source ; https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/20/how-warren-buffett-decides-what-to-invest-in.
August 14, 2020

Five Secrets To Buffett’s Success.

By John P. Reese.

Warren Buffett has made enough money by investing over the decades to warrant the attention he gets.
But why haven't others been able to generate the billions of dollars of personal wealth he has amassed using the same techniques? At Validea, I study and extract the stock selection methods of great investors and my strategies have come nowhere near Buffett’s incredible long-term results.
It could be that Buffett, and his Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A) conglomerate, follow some simple investment rules that others find difficult to follow.
Patience and discipline over the long-term—and we're talking decades, here, not quarters, months or weeks—isn't the hallmark of the typical investor. It is one of Buffett's strong suits.
Having a process and sticking with it through thick and thin is also difficult for the average investor, so much so that Buffett himself has advised those who can't do it to stick to low-cost funds that track market indexes. But there is also Buffett's willingness to not follow the crowd when stocks are hot and being brave when others aren't and grabbing those unique opportunities.

Here are five secrets to Buffett's success.

Dividend stocks.
Companies that pay dividends tend to have characteristics Buffett likes, such as a good market share and steady and reliable growth and profitability. Otherwise, management wouldn't feel comfortable giving a set portion of the cash flow every quarter back to investors. Dividend-paying companies historically outperform those that don't pay one.
Of course, for investors, dividends are a source of income, and Berkshire's $182 billion portfolio has certainly delivered on that score.
The payout on Berkshire's Bank of America (BAC) shares alone is more than $526 million. And Apple (AAPL) shares will pay about $737 million. Kraft Heinz pays $814 million and Coca Cola (KO) pays $624 million. Wells Fargo $760 million.
By one calculation, according to Motley Fool, Berkshire could collect more than $4.6 billion in dividend payments for 2019, based on the company's reported holdings. Berkshire's portfolio changes slightly from quarter to quarter, so that might not be an exact number, but the message is clear. Berkshire is making a lot of money from dividend investing.

Buy-and-hold strategy.
The portfolio also highlights Buffett's other secret: invest for the long term rather than attempting to time the market. This is a lesson he learned from Benjamin Graham, the so-called father of the value investing style, Buffett embraced decades ago. The underpinning of the strategy is to buy stocks, for less than they are worth fundamentally and hold on to them.
Someone who is frequently trading in and out of a stock is merely speculating on the direction of the market and various events that may affect it. That is a speculator, not an investor.
Truly value-oriented investors would be more concerned with a company's measurable value, including profitability and assets, not with the short-term events that create near-term price swings in the stock.
Berkshire's portfolio reflects Buffett's buy-and-hold philosophy. American Express (AXP) is a holding dating back to the mid-1960s. Coke (KO) shares have been in Berkshire's hands since the 1980s. So have shares of Wells Fargo (WFC).
Moody's Corporation (MCO) is another long-term holding going back more than a decade, as are U.S. Bancorp (USB) and Proctor & Gamble (PG).
Among Berkshire's biggest holdings, Apple is the newest entry, first appearing in 2017.

Don't be afraid to let go.
That is not to say Buffett hasn't made some mistakes, and he is open about them when he does. Shares of IBM (IBM) are the perfect example.
Berkshire had long shied away from technology stocks, but in 2011 began building a stake in IBM…..just as the company would begin an agonizing six-year stretch of declining revenue and shrinking market value. Berkshire finally tossed in the towel in 2018, admitting its investment thesis was flawed.
Buffett has also talked about famous misses, including Google, which has surged to over $1 trillion in market value in the last few years. He told shareholders at the annual meeting last year that he considered it and then passed. "I blew it."

Seize opportunities.
If Buffett's success is owed to anything, though, it's to being brave when others are afraid. This means taking a chance on a stock when the rest of the investing world is fleeing for the sidelines.
During the 2008-2009 financial crisis, when investors were panicking about the markets and banks were reeling from losses on mortgage-backed securities, Berkshire swooped in with a $5 billion deal to back Goldman Sachs. The deal included high-yielding preferred stock and the chance to buy more common stock down the road, which Berkshire did, netting billions when Goldman and the rest of the financial sector recovered.
Buffett stuck a similar deal in 2011 to help Bank of America, which was reeling from lawsuits dating back to the mortgage bond crisis. Berkshire swapped the preferred stock for common stock in 2017 and continued to increase his stake in the bank, collecting billions of dollars in dividends and capital gains along the way.

Don't follow the crowd.
Finally, Buffett avoids participating in a hot market. While the S&P 500 reached multiple records last year, Berkshire's pile of cash available to invest grew to $128 billion. This has baffled analysts but probably reflects Buffett's view that there isn't much out there that is valued to his liking, so the best solution is to avoid making a costly mistake and just wait it out.
Instead, Berkshire is doing something it hasn't done in the past: It's buying back its own stock, to the tune of $700 million in the third quarter and probably more for the final three months of last year. That reflects Buffett's belief that Berkshire is undervalued.
He told the Financial Times in an interview last year that the time Berkshire is finally trading at a fair price and the stock market also looks expensive would be his "nightmare."
For investors, you may not be able to achieve the performance Buffett has but these are timeless investing principles that can go a long way to helping you achieve good results in the stock market over time. Learning from successful investors like Buffett can go a long way for many investors.

August 04, 2020

How did Warren Buffett get started in business?

By BRENT RADCLIFFE.
Warren Buffett may have been born with business in his blood. He purchased his first stock when he was 11 years old and worked in his family’s grocery store in Omaha.
His father, Howard Buffett, owned a small brokerage, and Warren would spend his days watching what investors were doing and listening to what they said. As a teenager, he took odd jobs, from washing cars to delivering newspapers, using his savings to purchase several pinball machines that he placed in local businesses.

His entrepreneurial successes as a youth did not immediately translate into a desire to attend college. His father pressed him to continue his education, with Buffett reluctantly agreeing to attend the University of Pennsylvania. He then transferred to the University of Nebraska, where he graduated with a degree in business in three years.

After being rejected by the Harvard Business School, he enrolled in graduate studies at Columbia Business School. While there, he studied under Benjamin Graham – who became a lifelong friend – and David Dodd, both well-known securities analysts. It was through Graham's class in securities analysis that Buffett learned the fundamentals of value investing. He once stated in an interview that Graham's book, The Intelligent Investor, had changed his life and set him on the path of professional analysis to the investment markets. Along with Security Analysis, co-written by Graham and Dodd it provided him the proper intellectual framework and a road map for investing.

Benjamin Graham and The Intelligent Investor.
Graham is often called the "Dean of Wall Street" and the father of value investing, as one of the most important early proponents of financial security analysis. He championed the idea that the investor should look at the market as though it were an actual entity and potential business partner – Graham called this entity "Mr. Market" – that sometimes asks for too much or too little money to be bought out.

It would be difficult to summarize all of Graham's theories in full. At its core, value investing is about identifying stocks that have been undervalued by the majority of stock market participants. He believed that stock prices were frequently wrong due to irrational and excessive price fluctuations (both upside and downside). Intelligent investors, said Graham, need to be firm in their principles and not follow the crowd.
Graham wrote The Intelligent Investor in 1949 as a guide for the common investor. The book championed the idea of buying low-risk securities in a highly diversified, mathematical way. Graham favored fundamental analysis, capitalizing on the difference between a stock's purchase price and its intrinsic value.

Entering the Investment Field.
Before working for Benjamin Graham, Warren had been an investment salesman – a job that he liked doing, except when the stocks he suggested dropped in value and lost money for his clients. To minimize the potential of having irate clients, Warren started a partnership with his close friends and family. The partnership had unique restrictions attached to it. Warren himself would invest only $100 and, through re-invested management fees, would grow his stake in the partnership. Warren would take half of the partnership’s gains over 4% and would repay the partnership a quarter of any loss incurred. Furthermore, money could only be added or withdrawn from the partnership on December 31st, and partners would have no input about the investments in the partnership.

By 1959, Warren had opened a total of seven partnerships and had a 9.5% stake in more than a million dollars of partnership assets. Three years later by the time he was 30, Warren was a millionaire and merged all of his partnerships into a single entity.
It was at this point that Buffett’s sights turned to directly investing in businesses. He made a $1 million investment in a windmill manufacturing company, and the next year in a bottling company. Buffett used the value-investing techniques he learned in school, as well as his knack for understanding the general business environment, to find bargains on the stock market.

Buying Berkshire Hathaway.
In 1962, Warren saw an opportunity to invest in a New England textile company called Berkshire Hathaway and bought some of its stock. Warren began to aggressively buy shares after a dispute with its management convinced him that the company needed a change in leadership..  Ironically, the purchase of Berkshire Hathaway is one of Warren’s major regrets.
Understanding the beauty of owning insurance companies – clients pay premiums today to possibly receive payments decades later – Warren used Berkshire Hathaway as a holding company to buy National Indemnity Company (the first of many insurance companies he would buy) and used its substantial cash flow to finance further acquisitions.

As a value investor, Warren is a sort of jack-of-all-trades when it comes to industry knowledge. Berkshire Hathaway is a great example. Buffett saw a company that was cheap and bought it, regardless of the fact that he wasn’t an expert in textile manufacturing. Gradually, Buffett shifted Berkshire’s focus away from its traditional endeavors, instead using it as a holding company to invest in other businesses. Over the decades, Warren has bought, held and sold companies in a variety of different industries.

Some of Berkshire Hathaway’s most well-known subsidiaries include, but are not limited to, GEICO (yes, that little Gecko belongs to Warren Buffett), Dairy Queen, NetJets, Benjamin Moore & Co., and Fruit of the Loom.  Again, these are only a handful of companies of which Berkshire Hathaway has a majority share.
The company also has interests in many other companies, including American Express Co. (AXP), Costco Wholesale Corp. (COST), DirectTV (DTV), General Electric Co. (GE), General Motors Co. (GM), Coca-Cola Co. (KO), International Business Machines Corp. (IBM), Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (WMT), Proctor & Gamble Co. (PG) and Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC).

Berkshire Woes and Rewards.
Business for Buffett hasn’t always been rosy, though. In 1975, Buffett and his business partner, Charlie Munger, were investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for fraud. The two maintained that they had done nothing wrong and that the purchase of Wesco Financial Corporation only looked suspicious because of their complex system of businesses.
Further trouble came with a large investment in Salomon Inc. In 1991, news broke of a trader breaking Treasury bidding rules on multiple occasions, and only through intense negotiations with the Treasury did Buffett manage to stave off a ban on buying Treasury notes and subsequent bankruptcy for the firm.
In more recent years, Buffett has acted as a financier and facilitator of major transactions. During the Great Recession, Warren invested and lent money to companies that were facing financial disaster. Roughly 10 years later, the effects of these transactions are surfacing and they’re enormous.

A loan to Mars Inc. resulted in a $680 million profit.
Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), of which Berkshire Hathaway bought almost 120 million shares during the Great Recession, is up more than 7 times from its 2009.
American Express Co. (AXP) is up about five times since Warren’s investment in 200813
Bank of America Corp. (BAC) pays $300 million a year and Berkshire Hathaway has the option to buy additional shares at around $7 each – less than half of what it trades at today.
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) paid out $500 million in dividends a year and a $500 million redemption bonus when they repurchased the shares.

Most recently, Warren has partnered up with 3G Capital to merge J.H. Heinz Company and Kraft Foods to create the Kraft Heinz Food Company (KHC). The new company is the third largest food and beverage company in North America and fifth largest in the world, and boasts annual revenues of $28 billion. In 2017, he bought up a significant stake in Pilot Travel Centers, the owners of the Pilot Flying J chain of truck stops. He will become a majority owner over a six-year period.
Modesty and quiet living meant that it took Forbes some time to notice Warren and add him to the list of richest Americans, but when they finally did in 1985, he was already a billionaire. Early investors in Berkshire Hathaway could have bought in as low as $275 a share and by 2014 the stock price had reached $200,000, and was trading just under $300,000 earlier this year.

Comparing Buffett to Graham.
Buffett has referred to himself as "85% Graham." Like his mentor, he has focused on company fundamentals and a "stay the course" approach – an approach that enabled both men to build huge personal nest eggs. Seeking a seeks a strong return on investment (ROI), Buffett typically looks for stocks that are valued accurately and offer robust returns for investors.
However, Buffett invests using a more qualitative and concentrated approach than Graham did. Graham preferred to find undervalued, average companies and diversify his holdings among them; Buffett favors quality businesses that already have reasonable valuations (though their stock should still be worth something more) and the ability for large growth.

Other differences lie in how to set intrinsic value, when to take a chance and how deeply to dive into a company that has potential. Graham relied on quantitative methods to a far greater extent than Buffett, who spends his time actually visiting companies, talking with management and understanding the corporate's particular business model. As a result, Graham was more able to and more comfortable investing in lots of smaller companies than Buffett. Consider a baseball analogy: Graham was concerned about swinging at good pitches and getting on base; Buffett prefers to wait for pitches that allow him to score a home run. Many have credited Buffett with having a natural gift for timing that cannot be replicated, whereas Graham's method is friendlier to the average investor.

Buffett Fun Facts.
Buffett only began making large-scale charitable donations at age 75.
Buffett has made some interesting observations about income taxes. Specifically, he's questioned why his effective capital gains tax rate of around 20% is a lower income tax rate than that of his secretary – or for that matter, than that paid by most middle-class hourly or salaried workers. As one of the two or three richest men in the world, having long ago established a mass of wealth that virtually no amount of future taxation can seriously dent, Mr. Buffett offers his opinion from a state of relative financial security that is pretty much without parallel. Even if, for example, every future dollar Warren Buffett earns is taxed at the rate of 99%, it is doubtful that it would affect his standard of living.

Buffett has described The Intelligent Investor as the best book on investing that he has ever read, with Security Analysis a close second. Other favorite reading matter includes:
Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits by Philip A. Fisher, which advises potential investors to not only examine a company's financial statements but to evaluate its management. Fisher focuses on investing in innovative companies, and Buffett has long held him in high regard.
The Outsiders by William N. Thorndike profiles eight CEOs and their blueprints for success. Among the profiled is Thomas Murphy, friend to Warren Buffett and director for Berkshire Hathaway. Buffett has praised Murphy, calling him "overall the best business manager I've ever met."
Stress Test by former Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy F. Geithner, chronicles the financial crisis of 2008-9 from a gritty, first-person perspective. Buffett has called it a must-read for managers, a textbook for how to stay level under unimaginable pressure.
Business Adventures: Twelve Classic Tales from the World of Wall Street by John Brooks is a collection of articles published in The New Yorker in the 1960s. Each tackles famous failures in the business world, depicting them as cautionary tales. Buffett lent his copy of it to Bill Gates, who reportedly has yet to return it.

The Bottom Line.
Warren Buffett’s investments haven't always been successful, but they were well-thought-out and followed value principles. By keeping an eye out for new opportunities and sticking to a consistent strategy, Buffett and the textile company he acquired long ago are considered by many to be one of the most successful investing stories of all time. But you don't have to be a genius "to invest successfully over a lifetime," the man himself claims. "What's needed is a sound intellectual framework for making decisions and the ability to keep emotions from corroding that framework."

August 04, 2020

Warren Buffett reveals his investment strategy and mastering the market (PART 4).

ANDY SEWER: You talked a lot about the tax cuts and the benefits to Berkshire. You didn't really get into the costs of the tax cut, which surprised me a little bit. Are there costs? I mean, is it just free money?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it makes a difference. The tax cut we get, for example, our utilities, as I mentioned in the report, that goes to the customers. That's just the nature of utility regulation. But net, we were a significant beneficiary from the tax cut.

Basically, let's just say we had one class of stock. We got two. You and I own a business together, and we think we own all the stock. But the truth is, before the tax cut, the government had a 35% share of the stock on income.

Now they didn't have a share of the assets, but they had a share of the income. And if it wanted to change it to 40, it could've changed it. But fortunately, it changed it to 21. And if we had a private business, if we had a McDonald's franchise together or an auto dealership together-- the third shareholder-- that invisible shareholder, the government-- just handed us back a bunch of the shares of stock. And our shareholders benefited, and a lot of other shareholder benefited.

ANDY SEWER: You talked about Ajit Jain and Greg Abel saying that Berkshire blood flows through their veins. Have they made a difference since they become vice chairs? And then are they like Warren and Charlie?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, they don't have the interaction. They each run a separate business. Ajit does not think about the other businesses. He thinks about the insurance business. And Greg does not think about the insurance business at all. And I think about the money and the capital and so on.

They're running two very big businesses. I mean, Ajit's business has, all told, a couple of hundred billion of assets. And Greg's business has $150 billion of revenues. They both would fit up there toward the top 10 or so in the country in terms of value, maybe the top 15. But they're very big businesses.

ANDY SEWER: But they're not exactly like you two guys?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, Charlie and I have a partnership thinking about the whole place, and we've done it forever now, and we still do.

ANDY SEWER: And Todd and Ted? I didn't see them mentioned.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they have $13 billion each, including pension funds, our pension funds, that they run. So the $173 billion we had at year end in equities-- well, we had 173, but we had another $8 billion in pension funds. So of the 180 or so, they had 26 between them that they're managing.

They got total discretion on that. They don't ask me. At the month end, I look and see what they did. They don't do much. They don't do a lot of trading or anything. But I look to see what changes they made.

Todd, for example, he made a couple of small investments in private-placement-type operations. And I know what the businesses do, but I can't tell you their names.

ANDY SEWER: Was one of those-- you made this investment in Oracle, and you sold it. Was that something they did?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, that was not something they did. That was something I did.

ANDY SEWER: Yeah, and you said, you didn't understand it. That's why you sold. But than why'd you get it in the first place?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that's a good question to which I do not have a good answer. I know enough about the cloud to know I don't know enough about the cloud.

ANDY SEWER: Right. OK. So Barclays put out a note. They said they were lowering the estimates for Berkshire for EPS. Do you read that stuff?

WARREN BUFFETT: No. Well, I mean, I may read it accidentally, but I don't seek it out to read. I'll put it that way. It just doesn't make any difference. If I spent time reading that, I wouldn't have the time to read 10Ks. And we're not going to do anything different.

I don't know what we're going to earn. As I put in the annual report-- and I really think this is unique-- we do not prepare financial statements monthly for Berkshire. There's just no other company that would do it. But there's no sense doing it.

I know where the money is. I know how the companies are doing, generally, but what difference does it make? Because I'm not going to try and hit any number for the quarter by having a sale on insurance or doing something even worse. And Charlie, he knows where we stand. And we know what businesses are doing well and which aren't. We certainly know where the money is.

ANDY SEWER: Another one-- UBS survey of Berkshire investors says, the five most important things to them are succession, investment performance, M&A opportunities, share repurchase, insurance margins. Do you read that? Does that surprise you?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, but I don't disagree with that. Somebody understands this.

ANDY SEWER: Your own investors.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that's important. To go back to when I started my partnership in 1956 that Berkshire came out of, there were seven people sitting there at a table having dinner, relatives primarily. And I said, here's the partnership agreement.

It's done under Nebraska law. It's four or five pages. You don't need to read it. But I said, here's a little half page, what I call the ground rules. And I want you to read these, and if you feel OK about that-- about the interaction, what the expectations are, and all of that sort of thing-- then we'll join forces.

And if you don't, it's fine. We shouldn't be partners. If I'm going to have a partnership with somebody, I want to be compatible. And when you have a public company, you can't control who comes in. I can't control some guy comes in and thinks we were going to pay big dividends or split the stock or something like that.

So by my actions and my communications and everything, I want to attract the people from the public market that I want, and I want to keep the others away. Costco was built-- Sal Price, who started the Price Club, I think, he sat down and figured out the customer he didn't want. And he set up a system that would keep away the customer he didn't want.

Who did he not want? He didn't want somebody buying a quart of milk with somebody behind him with a basket of $200 worth of goods waiting for that. So he put in a membership fee. And by putting in a membership fee, he killed all the drop-in business, the business that belonged to the 7-Eleven.

We want Berkshire to keep out people who have expectations about us that are different than ours. Good for them, and I hope they find somebody they fit. But if you're going to run a church, you want your seats to be filled by people that generally want to listen to your form of religion.

And you don't want it to change every week and say, gee, I need a new group. And I'll go out and talk to a bunch of investors and get them to come to my church next Sunday. Because there's only so many seats in the church. There's a 1,645,000 or so A-equivalent shares. And those are the seats, and I want them occupied by people that are on the same page I am.

ANDY SEWER: The Church of Berkshire. Seems like you've got a big weighting in financials. And of course, you finally invested in Jamie Dimon's company. Why banks right now?

WARREN BUFFETT: They're businesses I understand, and I like the price at which they're selling relative to their future prospects. I think, 10 years from now, that they'll be worth more money. And I feel there's a very high probability I'm right. And I don't think they will turn out to be the best investments at all of the whole panoply of things you could do. But I'm pretty sure that they won't disappoint me.

ANDY SEWER: Is climate change changing your insurance businesses?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, it doesn't change the insurance business.

ANDY SEWER: Does it change modeling or something in the business?

WARREN BUFFETT: It would change our insurance business if we were writing 20-year policies. If there was something that changed life mortality adversely to the interests of a life insurance company, you're stuck with a policy for 20 years if you write the life insurance policy. You'll keep paying your premiums if it's adverse to me. That's what's happened in long-term care insurance, for example.

But when you write a policy for one year at a time, see what the developments are. Cars, for example, are much safer to drive than they used to be. There used to be 15 deaths per 100 million miles driven. Now, there's a little over one. On the other hand, they've become much more expensive to fix. That little side view mirror, which used to cost 10 bucks, is now 1,000 bucks or something like that.

So you have things that are changing in terms of, if you're writing collision insurance, you've got to allow for the fact that the windshield, the bumper, all kinds of things, the side view mirror and all that are way more expensive. But if you're writing liability, people aren't going to die as often.

Climate has been changing. But the truth is that you now can buy really big catastrophe limits cheaper than you could buy them in 2005 or thereabouts, allowing for changes in the dollar and concentration of population. So far, rates have come down. That's the reason we've gotten out of the cab business to a great degree.

We were a very big writer of cab business 10 or 12 years ago. We aren't out of the cab business because of climate change. We're because the prices aren't right. And the world will change, and that's got very serious consequences. But it won't change that much from year to year. We've done very well during a period of some climate change.

ANDY SEWER: You've talked about technology advancing faster than our ability to understand it. And I'm wondering if social media, and Facebook, and Google, and Russian trolls coming in, is that maybe an example of that? Are you still worried about that problem?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think cyber poses real risks to humanity. Forgetting about the problem even of misinformation. I'm just thinking of we have railroads running over 22,000 miles of track. And some of them are carrying ammonia. And some of them are carrying chlorine and things. We have to carry them. We have no choice about that. We're required by law to carry them.

I would rather do that in a non-cyber world than a cyber world. There are all kinds of things-- the problem by something like cyber is that it's moving, and it's just unpredictable whether you'll get some crazy guy, like stuck the anthrax in the-- you know, what they can do becomes magnified. You saw what 19 guys did on 9/11.

Tools in the hands or potentially in the hands of either crazy individuals, crazy groups, or even a few crazy governments are really something. And we don't necessarily know what all the tools they have are, and that is moving all the time. Again, Einstein said, I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones. It's a dangerous world.

ANDY SEWER: I don't know if you've following this, Warren, but what do you think of Elon Musk's behavior as a CEO?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it has room for improvement. [CHUCKLING] And he would say the same thing. It's just, some people have a talent for interesting quotes, and others have a little bit more of a blocker up there that says, this could get me in a problem. But he's a remarkable guy.

I just don't see the necessity to communicate. I think I've got seven tweets, because a friend of mine signed me up for it. And she's called me about 100 times saying, can I tweet this or that? I said yes to her seven times, I guess, or something like that. I've never actually written one myself. I don't even know how to do it.


TO BE CONTINUED
July 31, 2020

Ten Ways to Create Shareholder Value (part 2).

by Alfred Rappaport.
Principle 4.
Carry only assets that maximize value.
The fourth principle takes value creation to a new level because it guides the choice of business model that value-conscious companies will adopt. There are two parts to this principle.

First, value-oriented companies regularly monitor whether there are buyers willing to pay a meaningful premium over the estimated cash flow value to the company for its business units, brands, real estate, and other detachable assets. Such an analysis is clearly a political minefield for businesses that are performing relatively well against projections or competitors but are clearly more valuable in the hands of others. Yet failure to exploit such opportunities can seriously compromise shareholder value.
A recent example is Kmart. ESL Investments, a hedge fund operated by Edward Lampert, gained control of Kmart for less than $1 billion when it was under bankruptcy protection in 2002 and when its shares were trading at less than $1. Lampert was able to recoup almost his entire investment by selling stores to Home Depot and Sears, Roebuck. In addition, he closed underperforming stores, focused on profitability by reducing capital spending and inventory levels, and eliminated Kmart’s traditional clearance sales. By the end of 2003, shares were trading at about $30; in the following year they surged to $100; and, in a deal announced in November 2004, they were used to acquire Sears. Former shareholders of Kmart are justifiably asking why the previous management was unable to similarly reinvigorate the company and why they had to liquidate their shares at distressed prices.
Second, companies can reduce the capital they employ and increase value in two ways: by focusing on high value-added activities (such as research, design, and marketing) where they enjoy a comparative advantage and by outsourcing low value-added activities (like manufacturing) when these activities can be reliably performed by others at lower cost. Examples that come to mind include Apple Computer, whose iPod is designed in Cupertino, California, and manufactured in Taiwan, and hotel companies such as Hilton Hospitality and Marriott International, which manage hotels without owning them. And then there’s Dell’s well-chronicled direct-to-customer, custom PC assembly business model, which minimizes the capital the company needs to invest in a sales force and distribution, as well as the need to carry inventories and invest in manufacturing facilities.

Principle 5.
Return cash to shareholders when there are no credible value-creating opportunities to invest in the business.
Even companies that base their strategic decision making on sound value-creation principles can slip up when it comes to decisions about cash distribution. The importance of adhering to the fifth principle has never been greater: As of the first quarter of 2006, industrial companies in the S&P 500 were sitting on more than $643 billion in cash—an amount that is likely to grow as companies continue to generate positive free cash flows at record levels.

Value-conscious companies with large amounts of excess cash and only limited value-creating investment opportunities return the money to shareholders through dividends and share buybacks. Not only does this give shareholders a chance to earn better returns elsewhere, but it also reduces the risk that management will use the excess cash to make value-destroying investments—in particular, ill-advised, overpriced acquisitions.
Just because a company engages in share buybacks, however, doesn’t mean that it abides by this principle. Many companies buy back shares purely to boost EPS, and, just as in the case of mergers and acquisitions, EPS accretion or dilution has nothing to do with whether or not a buyback makes economic sense. When an immediate boost to EPS rather than value creation dictates share buyback decisions, the selling shareholders gain at the expense of the nontendering shareholders if overvalued shares are repurchased. Especially widespread are buyback programs that offset the EPS dilution from employee stock option programs. In those kinds of situations, employee option exercises, rather than valuation, determine the number of shares the company purchases and the prices it pays.

Value-conscious companies repurchase shares only when the company’s stock is trading below management’s best estimate of value and no better return is available from investing in the business. Companies that follow this guideline serve the interests of the nontendering shareholders, who, if management’s valuation assessment is correct, gain at the expense of the tendering shareholders.

When a company’s shares are expensive and there’s no good long-term value to be had from investing in the business, paying dividends is probably the best option.

Principle 6.
Reward CEOs and other senior executives for delivering superior long-term returns.
Companies need effective pay incentives at every level to maximize the potential for superior returns. Principles 6, 7, and 8 set out appropriate guidelines for top, middle, and lower management compensation. I’ll begin with senior executives. As I’ve already observed, stock options were once widely touted as evidence of a healthy value ethos. The standard option, however, is an imperfect vehicle for motivating long-term, value-maximizing behavior. First, standard stock options reward performance well below superior-return levels. As became painfully evident in the 1990s, in a rising market, executives realize gains from any increase in share price—even one substantially below gains reaped by their competitors or the broad market. Second, the typical vesting period of three or four years, coupled with executives’ propensity to cash out early, significantly diminishes the long-term motivation that options are intended to provide. Finally, when options are hopelessly underwater, they lose their ability to motivate at all. And that happens more frequently than is generally believed. For example, about one-third of all options held by U. S. executives were below strike prices in 1999 at the height of the bull market. But the supposed remedies—increasing cash compensation, granting restricted stock or more options, or lowering the exercise price of existing options—are shareholder-unfriendly responses that rewrite the rules in midstream.

Value-conscious companies can overcome the shortcomings of standard employee stock options by adopting either a discounted indexed-option plan or a discounted equity risk option (DERO) plan. Indexed options reward executives only if the company’s shares outperform the index of the company’s peers—not simply because the market is rising. To provide management with a continuing incentive to maximize value, companies can lower exercise prices for indexed options so that executives profit from performance levels modestly below the index. Companies can address the other shortcoming of standard options—holding periods that are too short—by extending vesting periods and requiring executives to hang on to a meaningful fraction of the equity stakes they obtain from exercising their options.
For companies unable to develop a reasonable peer index, DEROs are a suitable alternative. The DERO exercise price rises annually by the yield to maturity on the ten-year U.S. Treasury note plus a fraction of the expected equity risk premium minus dividends paid to the holders of the underlying shares. Equity investors expect a minimum return consisting of the risk-free rate plus the equity risk premium. But this threshold level of performance may cause many executives to hold underwater options. By incorporating only a fraction of the estimated equity risk premium into the exercise price growth rate, a board is betting that the value added by management will more than offset the costlier options granted. Dividends are deducted from the exercise price to remove the incentive for companies to hold back dividends when they have no value-creating investment opportunities.

Principle 7.

Reward operating-unit executives for adding superior multiyear value.
While properly structured stock options are useful for corporate executives, whose mandate is to raise the performance of the company as a whole—and thus, ultimately, the stock price—such options are usually inappropriate for rewarding operating-unit executives, who have a limited impact on overall performance. A stock price that declines because of disappointing performance in other parts of the company may unfairly penalize the executives of the operating units that are doing exceptionally well. Alternatively, if an operating unit does poorly but the company’s shares rise because of superior performance by other units, the executives of that unit will enjoy an unearned windfall. In neither case do option grants motivate executives to create long-term value. Only when a company’s operating units are truly interdependent can the share price serve as a fair and useful indicator of operating performance.

Companies typically have both annual and long-term (most often three-year) incentive plans that reward operating executives for exceeding goals for financial metrics, such as revenue and operating income, and sometimes for beating nonfinancial targets as well. The trouble is that linking bonuses to the budgeting process induces managers to lowball performance possibilities. More important, the usual earnings and other accounting metrics, particularly when used as quarterly and annual measures, are not reliably linked to the long-term cash flows that produce shareholder value.
To create incentives for an operating unit, companies need to develop metrics such as shareholder value added (SVA). To calculate SVA, apply standard discounting techniques to forecasted operating cash flows that are driven by sales growth and operating margins, then subtract the investments made during the period. Because SVA is based entirely on cash flows, it does not introduce accounting distortions, which gives it a clear advantage over traditional measures. To ensure that the metric captures long-term performance, companies should extend the performance evaluation period to at least, say, a rolling three-year cycle. The program can then retain a portion of the incentive payouts to cover possible future underperformance. This approach eliminates the need for two plans by combining the annual and long-term incentive plans into one. Instead of setting budget-based thresholds for incentive compensation, companies can develop standards for superior year-to-year performance improvement, peer benchmarking, and even performance expectations implied by the share price.

to be continued part 3.
July 25, 2020

Ten Ways to Create Shareholder Value (part 1).

by Alfred Rappaport.

It’s become fashionable to blame the pursuit of shareholder value for the ills besetting corporate America: managers and investors obsessed with next quarter’s results, failure to invest in long-term growth, and even the accounting scandals that have grabbed headlines. When executives destroy the value they are supposed to be creating, they almost always claim that stock market pressure made them do it.

The reality is that the shareholder value principle has not failed management; rather, it is management that has betrayed the principle. In the 1990s, for example, many companies introduced stock options as a major component of executive compensation. The idea was to align the interests of management with those of shareholders. But the generous distribution of options largely failed to motivate value-friendly behavior because their design almost guaranteed that they would produce the opposite result. To start with, relatively short vesting periods, combined with a belief that short-term earnings fuel stock prices, encouraged executives to manage earnings, exercise their options early, and cash out opportunistically. The common practice of accelerating the vesting date for a CEO’s options at retirement added yet another incentive to focus on short-term performance.

Of course, these shortcomings were obscured during much of that decade, and corporate governance took a backseat as investors watched stock prices rise at a double-digit clip. The climate changed dramatically in the new millennium, however, as accounting scandals and a steep stock market decline triggered a rash of corporate collapses. The ensuing erosion of public trust prompted a swift regulatory response—most notably, the 2002 passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which requires companies to institute elaborate internal controls and makes corporate executives directly accountable for the accuracy of financial statements. Nonetheless, despite SOX and other measures, the focus on short-term performance persists.

In their defense, some executives contend that they have no choice but to adopt a short-term orientation, given that the average holding period for stocks in professionally managed funds has dropped from about seven years in the 1960s to less than one year today. Why consider the interests of long-term shareholders when there are none? This reasoning is deeply flawed. What matters is not investor holding periods but rather the market’s valuation horizon—the number of years of expected cash flows required to justify the stock price. While investors may focus unduly on near-term goals and hold shares for a relatively short time, stock prices reflect the market’s long view. Studies suggest that it takes more than ten years of value-creating cash flows to justify the stock prices of most companies. Management’s responsibility, therefore, is to deliver those flows—that is, to pursue long-term value maximization regardless of the mix of high- and low-turnover shareholders. And no one could reasonably argue that an absence of long-term shareholders gives management the license to maximize short-term performance and risk endangering the company’s future. The competitive landscape, not the shareholder list, should shape business strategies.

The competitive landscape, not the shareholder list, should shape business strategies.

What do companies have to do if they are to be serious about creating value? In this article, I draw on my research and several decades of consulting experience to set out ten basic governance principles for value creation that collectively will help any company with a sound, well-executed business model to better realize its potential for creating shareholder value. Though the principles will not surprise readers, applying some of them calls for practices that run deeply counter to prevailing norms. I should point out that no company—with the possible exception of Berkshire Hathaway—gets anywhere near to implementing all these principles. That’s a pity for investors because, as CEO Warren Buffett’s fellow shareholders have found, there’s a lot to be gained from owning shares in what I call a level 10 company—one that applies all ten principles. (For more on Berkshire Hathaway’s application of the ten principles, please read my colleague Michael Mauboussin’s analysis in the sidebar “Approaching Level 10: The Story of Berkshire Hathaway.”).

Principle 1.

Do not manage earnings or provide earnings guidance.
Companies that fail to embrace this first principle of shareholder value will almost certainly be unable to follow the rest. Unfortunately, that rules out most corporations because virtually all public companies play the earnings expectations game. A 2006 National Investor Relations Institute study found that 66% of 654 surveyed companies provide regular profit guidance to Wall Street analysts. A 2005 survey of 401 financial executives by Duke University’s John Graham and Campbell R. Harvey, and University of Washington’s Shivaram Rajgopal, reveals that companies manage earnings with more than just accounting gimmicks: A startling 80% of respondents said they would decrease value-creating spending on research and development, advertising, maintenance, and hiring in order to meet earnings benchmarks. More than half the executives would delay a new project even if it entailed sacrificing value.

What’s so bad about focusing on earnings? First, the accountant’s bottom line approximates neither a company’s value nor its change in value over the reporting period. Second, organizations compromise value when they invest at rates below the cost of capital (overinvestment) or forgo investment in value-creating opportunities (underinvestment) in an attempt to boost short-term earnings. Third, the practice of reporting rosy earnings via value-destroying operating decisions or by stretching permissible accounting to the limit eventually catches up with companies. Those that can no longer meet investor expectations end up destroying a substantial portion, if not all, of their market value. WorldCom, Enron, and Nortel Networks are notable examples.

Principle 2.

Make strategic decisions that maximize expected value, even at the expense of lowering near-term earnings.
Companies that manage earnings are almost bound to break this second cardinal principle. Indeed, most companies evaluate and compare strategic decisions in terms of the estimated impact on reported earnings when they should be measuring against the expected incremental value of future cash flows instead. Expected value is the weighted average value for a range of plausible scenarios. (To calculate it, multiply the value added for each scenario by the probability that that scenario will materialize, then sum up the results.) A sound strategic analysis by a company’s operating units should produce informed responses to three questions: First, how do alternative strategies affect value? Second, which strategy is most likely to create the greatest value? Third, for the selected strategy, how sensitive is the value of the most likely scenario to potential shifts in competitive dynamics and assumptions about technology life cycles, the regulatory environment, and other relevant variables?

At the corporate level, executives must also address three questions: Do any of the operating units have sufficient value-creation potential to warrant additional capital? Which units have limited potential and therefore should be candidates for restructuring or divestiture? And what mix of investments in operating units is likely to produce the most overall value?

Principle 3.

Make acquisitions that maximize expected value, even at the expense of lowering near-term earnings.
Companies typically create most of their value through day-to-day operations, but a major acquisition can create or destroy value faster than any other corporate activity. With record levels of cash and relatively low debt levels, companies increasingly use mergers and acquisitions to improve their competitive positions: M&A announcements worldwide exceeded $2.7 trillion in 2005.

Companies (even those that follow Principle 2 in other respects) and their investment bankers usually consider price/earnings multiples for comparable acquisitions and the immediate impact of earnings per share (EPS) to assess the attractiveness of a deal. They view EPS accretion as good news and its dilution as bad news. When it comes to exchange-of-shares mergers, a narrow focus on EPS poses an additional problem on top of the normal shortcomings of earnings. Whenever the acquiring company’s price/earnings multiple is greater than the selling company’s multiple, EPS rises. The inverse is also true. If the acquiring company’s multiple is lower than the selling company’s multiple, earnings per share decline. In neither case does EPS tell us anything about the deal’s long-term potential to add value.

Sound decisions about M&A deals are based on their prospects for creating value, not on their immediate EPS impact, and this is the foundation for the third principle of value creation. Management needs to identify clearly where, when, and how it can accomplish real performance gains by estimating the present value of the resulting incremental cash flows and then subtracting the acquisition premium.

Value-oriented managements and boards also carefully evaluate the risk that anticipated synergies may not materialize. They recognize the challenge of postmerger integration and the likelihood that competitors will not stand idly by while the acquiring company attempts to generate synergies at their expense. If it is financially feasible, acquiring companies confident of achieving synergies greater than the premium will pay cash so that their shareholders will not have to give up any anticipated merger gains to the selling companies’ shareholders. If management is uncertain whether the deal will generate synergies, it can hedge its bets by offering stock. This reduces potential losses for the acquiring company’s shareholders by diluting their ownership interest in the postmerger company.

to be continued part 2.
July 25, 2020